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A PENNY FOR THEIR THOUGHTS: 
DRAFT RESISTANCE AT THE POSTON 
RELOCATION CENTER 
ERIC L. MULLER* 
“First, we were to prove our loyalty by going into centers; 
then we were to prove our loyalty by going out of the centers; 
now, we are to prove our loyalty by going to fight.” 
 
—Japanese American man, Poston Relocation Center,  
January 24, 19441 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Aristotle famously argued that like things must be treated alike in any moral 
system that is committed to justice.2  Aristotle would not have been happy with 
the cases of the Japanese American draft resisters of World War II.  Sixty years 
ago, mostly in the summer and fall of 1944, several hundred young internees 
were prosecuted in a number of federal district courts for refusing to be drafted 
from behind the barbed wire of their wartime concentration camps.3  These 
cases were essentially identical.  Yet different judges in different districts meted 
out widely varying prison sentences ranging from eighteen months in some 
cases in Idaho all the way up to five years in one case in Utah.4  In one federal 
district the resisters escaped with no criminal sentence at all.5  All of this varia-
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 This article is also available at http://law.duke.edu/journals/lcp. 
 *  George R. Ward Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
 1. Source Book for Poston Opinions on Relocation, December 1943 to July 1944, microformed on 
Community Analysis Reports and Community Analysis Trend Reports of the War Relocation Author-
ity, 1942-1946, Record Group (RG) 210, M1342, Reel 9 (on file with the National Archives and Re-
cords Administration [NARA], National Archives Building-Washington, DC) [hereinafter Community 
Analysis Reports, Reel 9]. 
 2. See ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICOMACHEA V.3.1131a-1131b (W.D. Ross trans. 1925); Peter 
Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 542-43 (1982). 
 3. I tell the story of these cases in my book FREE TO DIE FOR THEIR COUNTRY: THE STORY OF 
THE JAPANESE AMERICAN DRAFT RESISTERS IN WORLD WAR II (2001). 
 4. Idaho’s federal district judge sentenced the resisters from the Minidoka Relocation Center who 
went to trial to jail for stints of three years and three months, and those who pled guilty to eighteen-
month terms.  See id. at 129.  The resisters from the Heart Mountain Relocation Center in Wyoming 
got three-year sentences.  See id. at 113.  In one instance, a federal judge in Utah sentenced a resister to 
five years’ incarceration.  See id. at 182. 
 5. See United States v. Kuwabara, 56 F. Supp. 716, 719 (N.D. Cal. 1944) (dismissing outright the 
criminal charges against resisters from the Tule Lake Segregation Center on the due process basis that 
those charges were “shocking to the [judge’s] conscience”); infra text accompanying notes 224 and 304; 
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tion in outcomes led Frank Emi, one of the leaders of the draft resistance 
movement at Wyoming’s Heart Mountain Relocation Center, to wax Aristote-
lian in his assessment of American criminal justice: “What in the hell is the mat-
ter with this justice system?  It doesn’t make sense.  The charge[s are] the same, 
identical . . .”6 
Emi and Aristotle would have found especially little merit in the outcomes 
of the draft resistance cases from the Poston Relocation Center near Parker, 
Arizona.7  There, a single federal judge, David Ling, imposed three different 
sentences on the same cohort of resisters at different moments in the same case.  
When the first group of ten resisters pled guilty in his court in March of 1944, he 
sentenced them to three years in jail.8  When three additional resisters came be-
fore him for trial in April of 1945, he sentenced them to one year in jail.9  And 
in October of 1946, when the cases of around ninety-five additional resisters 
came before him, he imposed a fine of one cent on each of them.10  This was not 
a case of three different judges seeing identical cases three different ways, which 
would seem objectionable enough:  this was a case of one judge seeing identical 
cases three different ways at three different times. 
Or perhaps it is worse than that for Judge Ling.  He not only saw identical 
cases three different ways at three different times, but he also saw those cases in 
two different ways at the same time.  Consider carefully the action Judge Ling 
ultimately took:  he convicted the Poston resisters of the crime of willfully fail-
ing to report for induction into the army—a felony punishable by up to five 
years’ imprisonment11—yet the only punishment he saw fit to impose was a to-
ken fine of one cent.  This was a criminal judgment at war with itself:  the sol-
 
MULLER, supra note 3, at 131-45; Eric L. Muller, Constitutional Conscience, 83 B.U. L. REV. 1017, 
1017-27 (2003) [hereinafter Muller, Constitutional Conscience]. 
 6. Interview by Alan Koch with Frank Seishi Emi (Mar. 11, 1993 & Feb. 20, 1994), in JAPANESE 
AMERICAN WORLD WAR II EVACUATION ORAL HISTORY PROJECT: PART IV: RESISTERS 387 (Ar-
thur Hansen ed., 1995). 
 7. The camp’s official title was the “Colorado River War Relocation Center,” but it was popularly 
known as the “Poston Relocation Center” in honor of Charles Poston, a nineteenth-century Arizona 
pioneer and territorial official.  See PAUL BAILEY, CITY IN THE SUN: THE JAPANESE 
CONCENTRATION CAMP AT POSTON, ARIZONA 63, 79-80 (1971). 
 8. See United States v. Ikemiya et al., (D. Ariz. 1944) (on file with NARA-Pacific Region, Laguna 
Niguel, CA), District Courts of the United States for District of Arizona, RG 21, Phoenix Division, Box 
182, C-6782 – C6790) [subsequent citations to NARA-Pacific Region documents cross reference this 
citation and provide series, box, and case number only]; United States v. Nakasaki (D. Ariz. 1944) (on 
file with NARA-Pacific Region, supra note 8, at Box 182, C-6818). 
 9. See infra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.  This is a slight simplification, for narrative ease, 
of what Judge Ling actually did in April of 1945.  Of the ninety-seven cases he had before him, Judge 
Ling entered guilty verdicts on stipulated facts in the cases of three representative defendants, who 
then took appeals of their convictions to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  The other ninety-
four defendants agreed to await the outcome of those appeals and to have Judge Ling handle their 
cases consistently with the Ninth Circuit’s ultimate judgment in the three test cases.  See infra notes 
254-84 and accompanying text. 
 10. See, e.g., United States v. Miyamura, Judgment and Commitment Order (D. Ariz. Oct. 7, 1946) 
(on file with NARA-Pacific Region, supra note 8, at Criminal Case No. 7128-7199, Box 183, C-7132). 
 11. See 50 U.S.C.S. App. § 311 (1942) (current version at 50 U.S.C.S. App. § 462 (2000)). 
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emn condemnation of a felony conviction coupled with a fine so absurdly low as 
to imply that the resisters deserved no condemnation. 
It is easy to criticize Judge Ling’s constantly shifting and internally conflict-
ing resolutions of the cases of the Poston draft resisters.12  But in this article I 
would like to defend Judge Ling’s resolution of these cases, particularly the 
perplexing one on which he finally settled.  Resistance to the draft at Poston 
was a remarkably diverse and ambiguous phenomenon.  Poston’s was the larg-
est draft resistance of any of the camps:  one hundred and seven young men re-
fused either induction or a preinduction physical.13  As one might expect, the 
historical evidence reveals that these young men at Poston resisted the draft for 
more than just one reason.  Some had reasons that struck many as noble.  Many 
others had reasons that some saw as selfish or cowardly.  Resistance at Poston 
was really a muddle of mixed motives.  A criminal conviction and a one-penny 
fine captured the ambiguity of the Poston resistance about as well as any legal 
judgment could do. 
But Judge Ling’s judgment captured a good deal more than the variety of 
motives for resisting the draft.  However diverse and ambiguous the resisters’ 
reasons may have been, they all had a common source:  the cruel dilemma of 
being forced to respond to an order to emerge from behind barbed wire to fight 
for somebody else’s freedom.  Although many of the Poston resisters may have 
been legally wrong in their resolution of that dilemma, the government was le-
gally and morally wrong to have created it in the first place.  The complexity 
and seeming contradiction in Judge Ling’s judgment are therefore not deficits; 
they reflect the various complexities and contradictions in the situation that the 
judge confronted in sentencing the Poston resisters. 
This article will tell the story of the Nisei14 draft resisters of the Poston Relo-
cation Center and the varying punishments they received from Judge Ling.  Part 
II briefly summarizes the history of the military’s treatment of the Nisei be-
tween the Pearl Harbor attack of Dec. 7, 1941 and January of 1944, when the 
military announced the reinstatement of the draft.  Part III focuses specifically 
on Poston, detailing the resistance that greeted the effort to recruit volunteers; 
Part IV details Poston’s resistance to compulsory military service.  In Part V, 
the article recounts the story of the criminal prosecution of the Poston resisters 
and the various punishments they received.  Finally, Part VI defends Judge 
Ling’s varying sentences as accurate reflections of the many ambiguities and 
conflicts that marked the phenomenon of Nisei draft resistance during World 
War II. 
 
 12. Especially vulnerable to criticism is Judge Ling’s decision to leave in place the three-year sen-
tences in the ten initial cases that had come before him in March 1944 when, in October of 1946, he im-
posed the one-cent fine on the cases of ninety-seven others. 
 13. The case files of the Poston resisters are interspersed between docket number C-6782 and 
docket number C-6913 in the Records of the District Courts of the United States for the District of 
Arizona, NARA-Pacific Region, supra note 8, at Box 182. 
 14. Nisei are second-generation Japanese Americans born in the United States.  MINORU KIYOTA, 
BEYOND LOYALTY: THE STORY OF A KIBEI ix (1997). 
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II 
JAPANESE AMERICANS AND MILITARY SERVICE, 1942-1944 
Almost five thousand Nisei were serving in the United States Army in early 
December of 1941,15 and many thousands of others who had reached the age of 
eighteen were classified “I-A” and eligible for induction into the army under 
the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.16  All of that changed when the 
Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7.  Almost immediately, the Ni-
sei in the military were either discharged or shifted to potato-peeling duty.17  
Even more insultingly, on January 5, 1942, the Selective Service System reclassi-
fied all American citizens of Japanese ancestry into class IV-C, the category re-
served for “aliens not acceptable to the armed forces.”18 
The Nisei’s military status remained the same for over a year while they and 
their parents were evicted from their homes along the coast and warehoused in 
assembly and relocation centers.  But some in the Japanese American commu-
nity wanted the obligation of military service restored to the Nisei so that they 
could prove their American loyalty with their blood.19  The most vocal advo-
cates of Nisei military service were the top officials of the Japanese American 
Citizens League (“JACL”), which was at the time (and still is) the most promi-
nent national organization of American citizens of Japanese ancestry.  At an 
emergency meeting in Salt Lake City just before Thanksgiving in 1942, while 
more than 110,000 Japanese Americans sat behind barbed wire, JACL dele-
gates unanimously called for the government to reinstitute the draft for Japa-
nese Americans.20 
The JACL received support from several key federal officials who also 
wished to see the draft reinstated for the Nisei.  One was Dillon Myer, the head 
of the War Relocation Authority ("WRA"), who was eager to secure approval 
of a broad plan to allow the residents of the ten Japanese internment camps to 
relocate to points in the interior and believed that a showing of bravery by 
Japanese American troops would aid in that effort.21  Another was John J. 
McCloy, Secretary of War Henry Stimson’s top assistant, who also thought that 
military service would be key to what he termed the “rehabilitation” of Japa-
nese Americans.22  However, the JACL, Myer, and McCloy did not succeed 
right away in their primary goal of reinstituting the draft for the Nisei.  The 
most they were able to secure, in the spring of 1943, was the recruitment of Ni-
sei volunteers to join a segregated army unit that would be called the 442nd 
 
 15. See MULLER, supra note 3, at 41-42. 
 16. For a description of the classification system under the Selective Training and Service Act of 
1940, see Fletcher v. United States, 129 F.2d 262, 263 (5th Cir. 1942). 
 17. See MULLER, supra note 3, at 41-42. 
 18. See id. at 41. 
 19. See id. at 42-43. 
 20. See id. at 42. 
 21. See MULLER, supra note 3, at 44-45. 
 22. Id. at 43-44. 
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Regimental Combat Team.23  Far fewer Nisei volunteered from the camps in the 
spring of 1943 than the JACL predicted,24 but an enthusiastic response from 
young men in Hawaii guaranteed enough manpower to launch the Nisei unit.25  
Its impressive performance in training during the summer of 1943 and in Euro-
pean combat in the fall and early winter led the government finally to reopen 
the draft to the Nisei on January 20, 1944.26 
III 
RESISTANCE TO MILITARY SERVICE AT POSTON  
BEFORE THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE DRAFT 
Reinstatement of the draft for young Japanese Americans in January of 
1944 may have been the realization of a dream for the JACL, but for some 
young men in the camps and their families, it was a nightmare.  Between Janu-
ary of 1944 and mid-1945, when the camps closed, just over three hundred Nisei 
from nine of the ten WRA camps27 chose to defy military orders to report for 
induction or for the physical examination that preceded induction.  Of these 
three hundred resisters, fully one-third were from Poston.  The disproportionate 
disobedience at Poston was a product both of the camp’s general receptivity to 
resistance and of its own unique history of conflict specifically about military 
service. 
 
 23. Id. at 46-49.  The Navy never accepted Japanese Americans during World War II.  See id. at 47; 
ROGER DANIELS, CONCENTRATION CAMPS U.S.A.: JAPANESE AMERICANS AND WORLD WAR II, at 
147 (1971). 
 24. See MULLER, supra note 3, at 49. 
 25. See COMM’N ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL 
JUSTICE DENIED: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF 
CIVILIANS 197 (The Civil Liberties Public Education Fund, 1997) (1982) [hereinafter PERSONAL 
JUSTICE DENIED]; MULLER, supra note 3, at 58, 60. 
 26. See MULLER, supra note 3, at 60-64; DILLON S. MYER, UPROOTED AMERICANS: THE 
JAPANESE AMERICANS AND THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY DURING WORLD WAR II 152 
(1971). 
 27. The other nine centers were Manzanar and Tule Lake in California, Minidoka in Idaho, Heart 
Mountain in Wyoming, Gila River in Arizona, Topaz in Utah, Amache in Colorado, and Jerome and 
Rohwer in Arkansas.  Heart Mountain had eighty-five resisters.  MULLER, supra note 3, at 92.  Mini-
doka and Amache each had between thirty and forty.  See id. at 74; United States v. Akutsu et al., (D. 
of Idaho May 3, 1944) (on file with NARA-Pacific Northwest Region, Seattle, WA), District Courts of 
the United States for the District of Idaho, RG 21, Criminal Case No. 1911-51, Boxes 89-91, Nos. 2973-
3027 passim; United States v. Takamoto et al., (D. Colo. June 30, 1944) (on file with NARA-Rocky 
Mountain Region, Denver, CO, District Courts of the United States for District of Colorado, RG 21, 
Criminal Case No. 1912-1960, Boxes 295-98, Nos. 10347-10360 passim, 10446-10464, 10506, 10608).  
Tule Lake produced twenty-seven.  See MULLER, supra note 3, at 131.  Topaz, Gila River, and the Ar-
kansas camps had much smaller numbers of resisters.  I have found no record of any draft resister from 
Manzanar.  See generally Frank H. Wu, Difficult Decisions During Wartime: A Letter from a Non-Alien 
in an Internment Camp to a Friend Back Home, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1301, 1306 (2004) (explaining 
the dilemma of a fictional Nisei internee at Manzanar deciding between refusing or complying with the 
draft). 
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A. Poston’s Predisposition to Resistance 
That Poston was home to the largest number of draft resisters should come 
as no surprise.  Poston was, after all, the largest camp.28  When its population 
topped off at 17,814 in September of 1942, it was not only the largest WRA 
camp but the third largest city in the state of Arizona.29  As a percentage of total 
camp population, only the eighty-five resisters from Heart Mountain in Wyo-
ming exceeded the Poston resisters, and they did so just barely.30 
But resistance at Poston was a product of more than just numbers.  Other 
less tangible features of the camp created an atmosphere generally conducive to 
discontent and disobedience.  One, of course, was its climate.  While each of the 
ten WRA camps suffered excesses of climate in one form or another—extreme 
cold at Heart Mountain in Wyoming and buggy humidity in swampy Arkan-
sas—Poston surely must have been among the most intensely uncomfortable.  
Summertime temperatures in the desert of southwestern Arizona averaged 
around 107 degrees31 and ranged as high as 125,32 and the nights never really 
cooled off.  Scorching winds kicked up dust storms of legendary proportions.33  
A young man in the summer of 1944, hot-headed and irritable after two years of 
government mistreatment, was not likely to be cooled or soothed by Poston’s 
weather. 
Another factor priming Poston for resistance was the circumstances of its 
founding.  Poston was one of the first camps to open.  It received its first inhabi-
tants on May 8, 1942, and was home to more than 7,000 Issei34 and Nisei by 
month’s end.35  Tule Lake opened at around the same time;36 only Manzanar 
opened earlier.37  The rest of the camps did not open until mid- to late summer, 
 
 28. Poston consisted of three sub-units, each located about three miles apart on a north-south axis.  
See Lane Ryo Hirabayashi, Introduction: Why Read Nishimoto?, in RICHARD S. NISHIMOTO, INSIDE 
AN AMERICAN CONCENTRATION CAMP, at xxxiii (Lane Ryo Hirabayashi ed., 1995).  Unit I was de-
signed to accommodate around 10,000 residents; each of Units II and III was designed for half that 
number.  See PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 25, at 157. 
 29. See JEFFREY F. BURTON ET AL., CONFINEMENT AND ETHNICITY: AN OVERVIEW OF WORLD 
WAR II JAPANESE AMERICAN RELOCATION SITES 216 (2002). 
 30. Heart Mountain had 85 resisters out of an average 1944 population of 9,572, or 8.9 resisters per 
thousand camp residents; Poston had 107 resisters out of an average 1944 population of 12,923, or 8.3 
resisters per thousand camp residents.  See WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY, THE EVACUATED 
PEOPLE: A QUANTITATIVE DESCRIPTION 21 (1946); supra notes 8-10, 27-28 and accompanying text. 
 31. See Nat’l Climatic Data Center, Normal Daily Maximum Temperatures, Deg F, available at 
http://lwf.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/online/ccd/maxtemp.html (last visited October 19, 2004) (on file 
with Law & Contemporary Problems) (showing average maximum temperature readings in various 
Arizona cities from 1971-2000). 
 32. See Hirabayashi, supra note 28, at xxxiii. 
 33. See id.; see also The First Duststorm I Encountered in Poston (Apr. 1, 1943), microformed on 
Junior Red Cross Album, RG 210, M1342, Reel 11 (on file with NARA, National Archives Building-
Washington, DC). 
 34. Issei, or immigrants from Japan, is a combination of the Japanese words for “one” and “gen-
eration.”  DANIELS, supra note 23, at 5-6. 
 35. See BURTON ET AL., supra note 29, at 216. 
 36. See id. at 282. 
 37. See id. at 162-63. 
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or even early fall.  This early opening date had a significant—and destabiliz-
ing—impact on the adjustment and experience of Poston’s residents.38  They ar-
rived at a time when the WRA had not yet settled upon any clear policies about 
the length of their confinement, the availability of employment, or the possibil-
ity of their relocation further east.  All was uncertain.  Residents of the later-
occupied camps, by contrast, arrived to conditions of greater certainty, when 
better-defined WRA policies gave new residents “a more definite understand-
ing of the limitations and possibilities”39 of life in camp.  Moreover, residents at 
the later-occupied camps all emerged from a harrowing summer packed into 
chaotic and sometimes squalid assembly centers along the West Coast;40 to 
them, the inland relocation centers were an improvement.  Most of Poston’s 
residents, by contrast, never went to an assembly center; they were evicted from 
their homes and sent directly to Poston.41  The camp was therefore all they 
knew, and to their eyes there was a good deal more about which to be dissatis-
fied.42  Thus, it is no accident that when protests and violence rocked the camps 
in the fall of 1942, they struck at Poston, Manzanar, and Tule Lake—the camps 
that opened early. 
B. The Antecedents of Draft Resistance at Poston 
Poston was the camp where tensions reached the boiling point first.  While 
this first controversy was not about military service, it did interrupt the govern-
ment’s earliest quiet efforts to recruit internees into the army.  The event, 
known as the Poston “strike” or “incident,” took place in mid-November of 
1942 at a time of great anger and frustration over substandard camp conditions 
and a simultaneous breakdown in relations between the camp’s administrators 
and the internees’ elected council, and between that elected council and the 
rank and file of the internee community.43  A group of internees armed with a 
length of pipe broke into the apartment of Kay Nishimura, an internee whom 
many viewed as a corrupt government informant, and beat him savagely.44  
Camp officials immediately arrested two Kibei45 men, one of whom, George Fu-
jii, was “a popular and civic-minded young man who had been active in com-
munity affairs.”46  Soon, hundreds and even thousands of internees gathered in 
protest outside the camp’s jail, led mostly by Issei men who, because they were 
 
 38. See EDWARD H. SPICER ET AL., IMPOUNDED PEOPLE: JAPANESE AMERICANS IN THE 
RELOCATION CENTERS 63-64 (1969). 
 39. See id. at 65. 
 40. For a fuller description of the assembly centers, see PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 
25, at 135-48. 
 41. See Hirabayashi, supra note 28, at xxxv. 
 42. See SPICER ET AL., supra note 38, at 64. 
 43. See Extracts from a Report on the Poston Disturbance 1, microformed on Community Analysis 
Reports, Reel 9, supra note 1. 
 44. See BAILEY, supra note 7, at 119-21. 
 45. A Kibei was an American citizen of Japanese ancestry who had been educated in Japan.  See 
KIYOTA, supra note 14, at ix. 
 46. SPICER ET AL., supra note 38, at 132. 
08_MULLER_FIXED PROOFS.DOC 11/22/2005  11:34 AM 
126 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 68:119 
aliens, had until then been barred from involvement in the camp’s political life.47  
Camp administrators released Fujii because they had no evidence against him, 
but they continued to hold the other alleged assailant.48  And so the protests 
continued, turning into a general strike.  Political power ebbed from the ineffec-
tual Nisei-dominated community council and flowed to emboldened Issei lead-
ers.  Eventually the camp’s administrators negotiated a settlement of the upris-
ing, under which the alleged assailant who was still detained would be released 
and tried under the camp’s internal disciplinary system.  The incident trans-
formed the internal dynamics at Poston and ushered in an era of Issei political 
ascendancy that continued until the camp’s closing.49 
The incident also brought an incipient military recruiting effort to a halt.  
After kicking most Japanese Americans out of the army in the wake of Pearl 
Harbor, the military quickly learned that very few non-Japanese Americans 
could read, write, or speak Japanese, and that this was a major hindrance in a 
war with Japan.50  By November of 1942, the military had decided to make an 
appeal to the incarcerated Nisei and Kibei to leave camp for the Military Intel-
ligence Service Language School at Camp Savage in Minnesota.  As it hap-
pened, three Japanese American sergeants from Camp Savage arrived to recruit 
volunteers on November 17, 1942,51 the day before one thousand began protest-
ing outside Poston’s jail.52  A recruitment meeting that evening drew a crowd of 
about 350, mostly Issei and Kibei, but it quickly became clear that most were 
there to heckle and harass the army recruiters rather than to consider military 
service.53  Most of the questions came from the Kibei, and most were at least 
mildly antagonistic.54  When one of the army sergeants tried to make the case 
that the time was right for Japanese Americans to show their patriotism by vol-
unteering into the service, an Issei in the audience shouted “Yose, yose, 
bakayaro!,” which roughly translates as “stop your chattering, you god damn 
fool!”55  Initially, some forty Kibei and Nisei expressed a desire to enlist.56  But 
when they learned that they would be sent to the front, half of them dropped 
 
 47. Id. at 132-34. 
 48. Extracts from a Report on the Poston Disturbance 1-2, microformed on Community Analysis 
Reports, Reel 9, supra note 1. 
 49. See SPICER ET AL., supra note 38, at 134-35. 
 50. See Nat’l Japanese Am. Historical Soc’y, The Military Intelligence Service (MIS) 1941-1952, at 
http://www.njahs.org/research/mis.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2004) (on file with Law & Contemporary 
Problems). 
 51. See Tamie Tsuchiyama, Notes on Selective Service Registration 1 (Nov. 17, 1942), microformed 
on Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Records, 1930-1974 (JVAC), BANC MSS 67/14 c, 
Japanese-American Evacuation and Resettlement Study (“JERS”), Reel 239 (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with the Univ. of Cal.-Berkeley, Bancroft Library) [subsequent citations to JERS documents 
cross reference this citation and provide reel and frame information where available]. 
 52. See Extracts from a Report on the Poston Disturbance 2, microformed on Community Analysis 
Reports, Reel 9, supra note 1. 
 53. See Tsuchiyama, supra note 51, at 1-3. 
 54. Id. at 1-2. 
 55. Id. at 2. 
 56. Id. at 3. 
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out.57  The protests that broke out the next day further intimidated the potential 
volunteers, leading more than half of the remaining recruits to change their 
minds.  In the end, only seven young men left Poston for Camp Savage as a re-
sult of that recruiting effort.58 
No sooner had the Poston strike ended than internees began to learn of the 
unanimous vote by delegates to the JACL’s emergency conference in Salt Lake 
City to seek the restoration of the draft for the Nisei in the camps.  Several of 
the delegates, including the JACL’s national president, Saboru Kido, were from 
Poston and had purported to represent its residents at the conference.59  Their 
vote took the issue of Nisei military service from the fringes of the resistance at 
Poston and thrust it front and center.  On December 11, a group of men in 
Poston’s Unit II pressured Saboru Kido into signing a letter declaring that the 
JACL delegates had been speaking only for themselves in Salt Lake City, not  
for the residents of Poston, and that the JACL’s resolution in favor of military 
service “d[id] not apply to [the] people of Poston, Arizona.”60  The next day 
they pressed further, forcing him to sign a statement that directly contradicted 
JACL policy: 
We will be willing to join the resolution of the JACL [seeking the draft] providing the 
U.S. government will recognize all of our constitutional and civil rights as American 
citizens by granting privileges to citizens and alien parents to return to their original 
places prior to evacuation, and that the U.S. government will reimburse us on losses 
incurred because of evacuation.61 
A few weeks later, this second statement formed the basis of a strongly-worded 
petition to the President of the United States demanding restoration of civil 
rights that sixty-three Poston internees signed and sent off to Washington, DC.62  
Even this public statement did not stem the anger that some at Poston were 
feeling about military service.  On January 31, 1943, just three days after the 
army announced its plans to begin recruiting volunteers out of the camps into a 
segregated battalion,63 eight men ambushed Saboru Kido in his barrack and 
clubbed him so viciously that he spent three weeks in the hospital.64 
Pressure over military service at Poston continued to mount in February of 
1943.  This was when a military recruitment team came to camp to “register” all 
of the camp’s men of draft age—that is, to obtain answers from them to ques-
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See MULLER, supra note 3, at 44; Tsuchiyama, supra note 51, at 3. 
 60. Tsuchiyama, supra note 51, at 3-4. 
 61. Id. at 4.  This statement contradicted JACL policy because it made military service conditional 
on the restoration of rights. 
 62. Poston Internees to the President of the United States, 6 January 1943 (on file with NARA, 
National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD, JA INDUCTION, Feb. 1, 1943-Dec. 31, 1943, 
Record Group 107, Entry 183, Box 48, AWS 342.18). 
 63. See supra text accompanying note 23. 
 64. See MULLER, supra note 3, at 44; Matthew T. Estes & Donald H. Estes, Hot Enough to Melt 
Iron: The San Diego Nikkei Experience 1942-1946, http://www.jahssd.org/cgi-bin/page2.cgi?donarticle2 
(last visited October 21, 2004) (on file with Law & Contemporary Problems). 
08_MULLER_FIXED PROOFS.DOC 11/22/2005  11:34 AM 
128 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 68:119 
tions about their loyalty to the United States—and to persuade them to volun-
teer into the army.65  The registration team hoped to meet Poston’s designated 
quota of between four hundred fifty and five hundred volunteers66 out of an eli-
gible population of about 3,300 Nisei.67  Registration teams were at all ten of the 
WRA camps simultaneously, and at many of the camps their efforts triggered 
open resistance and protest that caused the process to drag on for days and 
even weeks longer than the army had anticipated.68  At Poston, the process went 
quickly and smoothly—at least on the surface.69  Beneath the surface, however, 
conflict bubbled. 
The main conflict was intergenerational.70  Many Issei—probably a major-
ity—did not want their sons to volunteer.  They had a number of reasons.  Some 
of them did not want their sons taking up arms against the country in which 
they still held citizenship and to which they felt loyal.71  Some felt that the gov-
ernment had so mistreated them, and had left them so vulnerable in camp, that 
they could not imagine losing the support of a son.72 
Among the Nisei, views were mixed.  A limited number—far fewer than the 
army had hoped—did volunteer.  Their reasons were varied.  Some volunteers 
saw military service in just the way the government and the JACL were present-
ing it to them—as an opportunity to prove the loyalty of Japanese Americans.73  
Some thought that a veteran’s benefit in a civil service job would be the only 
way for a Japanese American to get fair treatment in the post-war job market.74  
Some, especially those with a medical or dental background, wanted the good 
pay and considerable professional experience that the army would provide.75  
Some wanted the financial security that the army offered.76  Some simply 
 
 65. See MULLER, supra note 3, at 49-58. 
 66. Tsuchiyama, supra note 51, at 16. 
 67. See id. at 25. 
 68. See MULLER, supra note 3, at 49-58; SPICER ET AL., supra note 38, at 142-56. 
 69. See MULLER, supra note 3, at 52. 
 70. See, e.g., A Volunteer Speaks (Mar. 9, 1943) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Division 
of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell Univ. Library, Japanese-American Relocation Center Re-
cords, #3830, Box 11) (recording the struggles of an eighteen-year-old Japanese American with his par-
ents when he told them that he volunteered for the army). 
 71. See, e.g., Untitled Manuscript 3 (Mar. 1943), (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Division 
of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell Univ. Library, Japanese-American Relocation Center Re-
cords, #3830, Box 11) (“The people in the block severely criticized the mothers of the two volunteers 
for allowing their boys to go ‘and fight against their own people.’”). 
 72. See Sentiments—Volunteering for the Army 1 (Mar. 5, 1943), (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with the Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell Univ. Library, Japanese-American Re-
location Center Records, #3830, Box 11). 
 73. Letter, “Dave,” Volunteer, U.S. Army, to Iwao Ishino 1 (Feb. 23, 1943), (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell Univ. Library, Japanese-
American Relocation Center Records, #3830, Box 11). 
 74. See, e.g., Tsuchiyama, supra note 51, at 21. 
 75. See, e.g., id. 
 76. See, e.g., id. 
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wanted a quick ticket out of camp, to escape boredom77 or to leave an unhappy 
relationship.78  Many of those who did wish to volunteer, however, met intense 
disapproval from their parents.  A rumor circulated in camp that several volun-
teers had clashed so intensely with their parents that the young men had nerv-
ous breakdowns and needed to be briefly hospitalized.79 
Most Nisei, however, did not volunteer.  Many showed up at the recruitment 
teams’ question-and-answer sessions to ask difficult and even hostile questions 
that emphasized the mistreatment and discrimination they were enduring.80  
Some wished to avoid a clash with their parents and decided simply to stay in 
camp and wait for an eventual draft.81  Some resented that the army would ac-
cept the Nisei only in a racially segregated battalion.82 
In the end, the recruitment effort at Poston did less good and more harm 
than its government planners could have imagined.  Only 228 young men volun-
teered—half the number that the army had anticipated.83  The relations between 
Issei and Nisei, already strained, grew even more complicated.  And the mood 
in camp, although calm, grew more depressed.  “All the young fellows who have 
been so carefree and happy,” a volunteer wrote to a friend outside camp late in 
February, “are . . . walking around with long, sad, and serious faces.”84 
Spirits were undoubtedly buoyed, at least a bit, in May of 1943, when the 
camp held a large send-off assembly for its couple of hundred volunteers.85  
Camp administrators and internee leaders delivered patriotic speeches, and a 
 
 77. This view about military service was expressed by a Nisei contemplating the draft in mid-July 
of 1944:  “Although I don’t especially see any reason to fight for the United States, I’d choose the army 
to another camp because I don’t think that I can stand another couple of years in jail or a camp.”  Se-
lective Service (July 19, 1944), microformed on Community Analysis Reports and Community Analysis 
Trend Reports of the War Relocation Authority, 1942-1946, RG210, M1342, Reel 10 (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with NARA-Washington, DC) [hereinafter Community Analysis Reports, Reel 10]. 
 78. See, e.g., Tsuchiyama, supra note 51, at 21. 
 79. Tsuchiyama, supra note 51, at 10; Untitled Manuscript 4 (Mar. 1943) (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with the Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell Univ. Library, Japanese-
American Relocation Center Records, #3830, Box 11). 
 80. See Friday, Feb. 15, 1943 – 201 Mess Hall, 7:30 p.m., supra note 51, at Reel 239, Frames 323-29; 
Norris E. James, Transcript of Questions and Answers Asked Lieut. John Bolton, U.S. Army Team, at 
Mess Hall No. 310, Poston III (Feb. 9, 1943), supra note 51, at Reel 234, Frames 24-28; Meeting for 
Registration of Roku I (Feb. 10, 1943), (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Division of Rare and 
Manuscript Collections, Cornell Univ. Library, Japanese-American Relocation Center Records, #3830,  
Box 11); Tsuchiyama, supra note 51, at 14-16. 
 81. MULLER, supra note 3, at 53; cf. A Volunteer Speaks, supra note 70, at 2 (“I figured that I 
don’t want to stay in this camp and since I will be drafted anyway, I might as well go now.”). 
 82. See Letter from Soldier at Camp Robinson to a youth in camp (Mar. 6, 1943) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell Univ. Library, Japa-
nese-American Relocation Center Records, #3830, Box 11) (“Of course I don’t like the idea of putting 
us all together like the Negroes”). 
 83. ROGER DANIELS, ASIAN AMERICA: CHINESE AND JAPANESE IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 
1850, at 252 (1988); cf. Tsuchiyama, supra note 51, at 25 (reporting 191 volunteers). 
 84. Letter from “Dave” to Iwao Ishino, supra note 73, at 2. 
 85. See Volunteers Leaving for Induction (May 5, 1943) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell Univ. Library, Japanese-American Relocation 
Center Records, Collection #3830, Box 11. 
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musical segment included singers, dancers, and mouth-organ players.86  The vol-
unteers were trained at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, alongside volunteers from 
the 100th Infantry Battalion from Hawaii, and in August of 1943 the soldiers left 
for North Africa as the 442nd Regimental Combat Team.87  They saw their first 
combat late in September in Italy, and took very heavy casualties, word of 
which naturally reached and saddened the internee community they had left 
behind at Poston.88  But the bravery and accomplishments of the men of the 
442nd in the fall of 1942 also helped persuade army officials that the time was 
ripe for reinstating the draft.89 
IV 
REACTION AND RESISTANCE TO THE DRAFT AT POSTON 
A. Reactions to the Draft 
The War Department announced its new policy of drafting the Nisei out of 
the camps on January 20, 1944.90  The Nisei would be removed from the IV-C 
category that had so offended them, “reclassified by their Selective Service 
boards on the same basis as other citizens, and called for induction if physically 
qualified and not deferred.”91  The news was announced by radio92 and newspa-
per93 at Poston, but took a few days to sink in.94  Camp administrators thought 
the initial reaction was largely favorable.  However, Project Attorney Theodore 
H. Haas, an astute observer of relations between the internees and the camp’s 
administration, suspected that what camp administrators were seeing was not 
the whole truth.  In a January 29 report to WRA headquarters in Washington, 
DC, Haas noted that “in contradiction to their expressions to most [camp offi-
cials],” some of the camp’s residents “felt that in view of the treatment of the 
Japanese Americans it was not right to induct them.”95 
It is not at all surprising that Poston’s internees might be cynical about the 
fairness of the draft and of the ways in which it would be enforced.  The Ari-
zona courts, for example, had a poor record with internees from Poston.  Just 
 
 86. See id. 
 87. MULLER, supra note 3, at 58, 60. 
 88. See id. at 60, 62-63. 
 89. See id. at 60; MYER, supra note 26, at 152. 
 90. MULLER, supra note 3, at 64. 
 91. War Department Bureau of Public Relations Press Branch, Selective Service to Be Reinstated 
for Americans of Japanese Descent (Jan. 19, 1944) (on file with NARA, National Archives at College 
Park, College Park, MD, “JA INDUCTION, Feb. 1, 1943-Dec. 31, 1943, RG” 107, Entry 183, Box 48 
ASW 342.18). 
 92. See Diary of Richard S. Nishimoto, Entry of Jan. 21, 1944, at 1, supra note 51, at Reel 236, 
Frame 109 [hereinafter Nishimoto Diary]. 
 93. See War Department Announces Drafting of Nisei, POSTON CHRON., Jan. 22, 1944, at 1. 
 94. See Nishimoto Diary, Entry of Jan. 21, 1944, at 1, supra note 51, at Reel 236, Frame 109. 
 95. Letter from Theodore H. Haas, Project Attorney, Colorado River War Relocation Center, to 
Philip M. Glick, Solicitor, War Relocation Authority 3 (Jan. 29, 1944), supra note 51, at Reel 196, 
Frame 24. 
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three days before the draft was reinstated, a Nisei pled guilty in the Phoenix 
courtroom of Judge David Ling, Arizona’s lone federal district judge, to the 
charge of possessing liquor in Indian territory.96  Judge Ling sentenced the man 
to a year in federal prison for this offense, while a non-internee convicted of the 
offense of selling liquor to an Indian received a sentence of five months.97  This 
and other disparities in sentences meted out to internees led a lawyer from the 
Poston Project Attorney’s Office to complain of the “general vague belief” pre-
vailing in both the federal and state courts “that Japanese in a relocation center 
are either disloyal, suspected of disloyalty, or are potentially dangerous to the 
war efforts” of the United States.98 
On the specific question of the draft itself, the legal system and camp admin-
istrators were sometimes manipulative.  In mid-February of 1944, as opposition 
to the draft at Poston gathered steam, a twenty-year-old Nisei was arrested for 
selling a few gallons of government gasoline out of the gas tank of a car in 
which he had been sent to the nearby town of Parker to do errands.99  When the 
Project Attorney went to Phoenix to post bail for the young man, the U.S. At-
torney prosecuting the case offered a deal:  he told the lawyer that “he would 
not be interested in pressing th[e] case if the defendant was interested in going 
into the Army.”100  Poston’s community analyst came up with an even sneakier 
way of enticing young men in camp into going along with the draft.  In early 
July of 1944, as larger and larger numbers of young men refused to show up for 
induction, the Community Analyst David French argued to the Project Director 
that the Nisei should be lured into the service with alcohol: 
The Nisei inductees—American soldiers.  The M.P.'s—American soldiers.  The M.P.’s 
have beer on the other side of the Highway.  The inductees cannot drink beer on this 
side of the Highway.  They should be treated alike.  Therefore, beer for the Nisei in-
ductees.  Right?101 
There is no evidence that the Project Director accepted French’s suggestion. 
By the same token, it is also not surprising that the camp’s white administra-
tors did not see the whole truth of the internees’ reactions to the reinstatement 
of the draft.  Those studying the Poston community noted the tendency of most 
to be “very much on guard” in talking about the draft even with other internees, 
to avoid “unpredictable misinterpretation.”102  With administrators, people were 
 
 96. See Letter from Thomas Masuda, Acting Project Attorney, Colorado River War Relocation 
Center, to Philip M. Glick, Solicitor, War Relocation Authority 1 (Jan. 22, 1944), supra note 51, at Reel 
196, Frame 21.  This criminal offense is currently codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1154 (2000). 
 97. See Letter from Thomas Masuda to Philip M. Glick, at 1, supra note 51, at Reel 196, Frame 21. 
 98. Id.  For more on the treatment of Nisei defendants in federal district courts in Wyoming and 
Idaho, see MULLER, supra note 3, at 100-30. 
 99. See Letter from Theodore H. Haas, Project Attorney, Colorado River War Relocation Center, 
to Philip M. Glick, Solicitor, War Relocation Authority 3 (Feb. 17, 1944), supra note 51, at Reel 196. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Nishimoto Diary, Entry of July 3, 1944, at 3, supra note 51, at Reel 237, Frame 126. 
 102. Draft: Issei 35 College Graduate (Jan. 26, 1944), microformed on Community Analysis Re-
ports, Reel 10, supra note 77. 
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even more guarded.103  But this guardedness concealed a complex and varied set 
of reactions to the dilemma of the draft.104 
Many at Poston greeted news of the draft with resignation, and without sur-
prise.105  “We have been expecting that right along,” said one Nisei man in his 
forties shortly after the January 20 announcement.106  “There is not too much 
excitement over the announcement,” said an Issei leader in his forties; “[m]any 
people expected it . . . .”107  Genuine enthusiasm for military service was rare.  
“It’s a good thing; I want to go,” said one Kibei in his twenties.  But, he added, 
“I hope we don’t have [racially] separate units.”108  Even those who were enthu-
siastic about the draft could not escape the reality of discrimination against the 
Nisei. 
More typical, in content and perhaps emotion, was the reaction of a draft-
eligible Nisei who learned of the reinstitution of selective service when he asked 
to see the announcement that a camp administrator held in his hand.  With his 
lower lip quivering, the young man said, “If I have to go, I have to go, but . . . I 
think it is selfish of the American government . . . .”109  “[This] sure changes my 
life,” the upset Nisei added.  “Now I don’t know what to do.”110  Another Nisei 
expressed a similar view:  “If I go into the army, I’ll go with mixed feelings and 
most of my friends will also.”111  A twenty-six-year-old Nisei put it this way on 
January 24, four days after the announcement:  “If they draft us, I’ll go, but I 
wouldn’t know what I was fighting for, not after being treated this way.”112 
 
 103. See id. 
 104. Of all of the ten camps, Poston offers researchers the fullest glimpse into the complexity of the 
reaction to the draft and of the variety of motivations that young men had for resisting.  Poston was the 
site of three independent anthropological studies, all of which were in operation at the time of the draft 
crisis in 1944.  One was the work of the WRA’s Community Analysis office, under the direction of Ed-
ward Spicer.  A second was the Bureau of Sociological Research, directed by Alexander Leighton, 
M.D.  The third was the Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Study (“JERS”), under the 
direction of Dorothy Swaine Thomas, Ph.D., of the University of California at Berkeley.  See generally 
LANE RYO HIRABAYASHI, THE POLITICS OF FIELDWORK: RESEARCH IN AN AMERICAN 
CONCENTRATION CAMP (1999) (documenting the sociological studies underway at Poston).  Each of 
these programs employed Japanese Americans to gather and analyze demographic, sociological, and 
even psychological information about the incarceration experience at Poston.  In addition, Richard S. 
Nishimoto, a Poston internee who worked with Thomas on the JERS, kept a daily diary of important 
camp events, and Theodore H. Haas and Scott Rowley, Poston’s Project Attorneys, sent detailed 
weekly reports to WRA headquarters in Washington, DC.  These sources provide an unrivaled view 
into the reaction of the Issei and the Nisei to the reinstatement of the draft in 1944. 
 105. See, e.g., Nishimoto Diary, Entry of Jan. 22, 1944, at 1, supra note 51, at Reel 236, Frame 114 
(“I am ready whenever they call me . . . .  There is nothing I can do about it when I get the call.”). 
 106. Drafting of Niseis: Nisei male in 40’s (Jan. 21, 1944) microformed on Community Analysis Re-
ports, Reel 10, supra note 77. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Selective Service: Nisei fellow on Stop List (Jan. 24, 1944), microformed on Community Analy-
sis Reports, Reel 10, supra note 77. 
 112. Draft: 3 Eligible men (Jan. 24, 1944), microformed on Community Analysis Reports, Reel 10, 
supra note 77. 
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In the days after the announcement of the draft’s reopening, some Nisei 
were simply unable to say that they would comply.  “The draft is all right if one 
has never been put in the center,” one person said, “but the fellows inside 
should not be drafted.  You don’t feel right about being drafted after being put 
in here.”113  The reason that this internee did not “feel right” about being 
drafted was that the reinstitution of the draft seemed an unacceptable way to 
restore full Nisei citizenship.  “If [we were] not drafted, we [would be] . . . will-
ing to overlook the evacuation mistake of the government,” he explained.  But 
“. . . Nisei rights must be restored 100%, not only by being drafted but [by be-
ing] given full citizenship status.”114  “My feeling,” said a Kibei in his twenties, 
“i[s] that it’s too late now for Selective Service.  They took our citizenship away, 
put us in a concentration camp, and classified us as enemy aliens.”115  The Nisei 
had “an uncomfortable feeling inside,” this young man reported.  “They have 
taken advantage of us; when they feel like it, they change our classification.”116 
The Issei's first reactions showed some of the same ambivalence as their 
children's.  Interviewers canvassing the camp in the days after the announce-
ment of the draft did find some Issei who voiced support for military service, 
but that support sat uncomfortably on a foundation of frustration and resigna-
tion.  One Issei father of three, for example, said that “[b]oys born in this coun-
try have a responsibility and it is inevitable that they should serve their coun-
try.”117  He noted that “[h]aving the citizens in camp is not right,” but he 
nonetheless thought the draft “inevitable, so the people must do their duty to 
their country.”118  An Issei widow expressed herself philosophically about the 
importance of the draft in helping the Nisei move forward: “The Issei’s turn to 
sacrifice is over,”119 she said.  “Thirty or forty years of toil ha[ve] evaporated 
into thin air.”  So now it was the Nisei’s “turn to pioneer and to sacrifice so that 
the 3rd, 4th and 5th generations of Japanese ancestry can be proud for the sacri-
fices of the people in the foundation of this country.”  “Don’t let these things be 
in vain,” she implored her Nisei son.  “Go do your very best so that the genera-
tion after you will be proud.”120 
Most of the Issei, however, were unable to move past their anger on their 
children’s behalf and their own worries and fears.  “America has lots of nerve to 
play havoc with her Japanese population so selfishly, so lightly,” said one Issei 
 
 113. Relocation: Selective Service (Jan. 21, 1944), microformed on Community Analysis Reports, 
Reel 10, supra note 77. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Drafting of Niseis: Kibei in 20’s (Jan. 24, 1944), microformed on Community Analysis Reports, 
Reel 10, supra note 77. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Selective Service: B 5 Y (Feb. 3, 1944), microformed on Community Analysis Reports, Reel 10, 
supra note 77. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Selective Service: Japanese Welfare (Feb. 5, 1944), microformed on Community Analysis Re-
ports, Reel 10, supra note 77. 
 120. Id. 
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woman with two draft-eligible sons.121  “When it is convenient the Niseis are not 
citizens—deprive them [of] all rights and put them in Centers; [w]hen they want 
more soldiers the Nisei are all loyal and worthy of the draft. . . .  It’s a wonder 
the same people could say these things in one breath.”122  A wealthy Issei 
woman stated her views on the draft even more starkly: 
I don’t like it.  When I think of what the Government did to our children back in Cali-
fornia, they could not even talk to American friends on our porch because the FBI 
would arrest them for violating curfew. . . .  Then they put our children in here.  The 
Italians and Germans did not go through this.  Now they want to draft them.  That is 
some irony, it is too much.123 
And an Issei father of two draft-age Nisei felt that he was about to lose every-
thing:  “After being evacuated to this relocation center from the outside I have 
lost everything in worldly goods.  All I have left is my family.”124  Because of 
this, he did not want his “boys to go to the army and give their lives up—
whether for this country or any other country after being treated this way.  I’d 
rather have them go to prison,” he said, “and know that they will come back 
alive someday.”125 
While many at Poston did nothing more than talk and worry about the draft 
in the weeks after January 20, some decided to try to take action to protect 
themselves from it.  There were two strategies.  One was to try to get out of 
camp, on the theory that people who had left camp, especially to do agricultural 
work, would be less likely to be drafted than those who remained in camp.  
Thus, in early February, requests for seasonal leave to do farm work spiked up-
ward,126 and Poston’s relocation office was swamped with applications.127  Its staff 
had little doubt that many Nisei were looking to relocate as a way of escaping 
the draft.128  The other strategy for avoiding the draft that some Nisei tried to 
use—often at the behest of their parents—was to file a request for expatria-
tion.129  In the month of February 1944 alone, 150 Nisei filed requests for expa-
triation—nearly half as many as had applied for expatriation in the twenty pre-
ceding months combined.  In March, the number of expatriation requests 
 
 121. Reactions to New Selective Service Status of Nisei (Jan. 21, 1944), microformed on Community 
Analysis Reports, Reel 10, supra note 77. 
 122. Id. 
 123. The Draft: Rich Farmer’s Wife (Jan. 24, 1944), microformed on Community Analysis Reports, 
Reel 10, supra note 77. 
 124. Selective Service: Issei father of two boys of draft age (Jan. 24, 1944), microformed on Com-
munity Analysis Reports, Reel 10, supra note 77. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See Relocation (Feb. 22, 1944), microformed on Community Analysis Reports, Reel 10, supra 
note 77. 
 127. See Relocation: By Nisei relocation officer (Feb. 10, 1944), microformed on Community Analy-
sis Reports, Reel 10, supra note 77. 
 128. See id.  See also Relocation: CR Selective Service, Issei Woman in 50’s (Feb. 1, 1944), micro-
formed on Community Analysis Reports, Reel 10, supra note 77 (“I hope they let us leave the project.  
It is not a matter of wages or opportunities; it is the matter of saving life.”). 
 129. See Notes of Meeting, Family Welfare Section 4 (Mar. 31, 1944), supra note 51, at Reel 234, 
Frame 56. 
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jumped to 375.130  Poston’s Family Welfare Section, which gathered data on 
these expatriation requests and the reasons behind them, concluded that for 
many Nisei, the draft was the government demand that caused years of resent-
ment and anger over discrimination and incarceration to crystallize into ac-
tion.131  This strategy, however, would ultimately fail because the government 
later elected to treat all expatriation requests filed after the date of the an-
nouncement of the reinstatement of selective service as invalid efforts at draft 
evasion.132 
B. Resistance to the Draft 
The month of February 1944 was one of change and uncertainty in the ad-
ministration of the Poston Relocation Center.  At the very end of January, less 
than two weeks after the announcement of the reopening of the draft, Project 
Director Wade Head, who had managed Poston since its opening in 1942, left 
his post, to be replaced by Duncan Mills.  Nearly simultaneously, Poston’s Pro-
ject Attorney Ted Haas, who had also been at Poston since it opened, left 
Poston for a position with the Office of Indian Affairs.  He was replaced by 
Scott Rowley, a law professor from Drake University who was completely new 
to the WRA and conditions at Poston.133  And on February 17, 1944, the War 
Relocation Authority itself ceased being a freestanding federal agency and was 
taken over by the Department of the Interior.134 
Perhaps to offer some stability in this difficult transition, WRA Director 
Dillon Myer traveled to Poston to meet with internee leaders and oversee the 
transition from Wade Head to Duncan Mills.135  Myer tried to give an upbeat 
speech, emphasizing how much the services and mood at Poston and the other 
WRA camps had changed since they had opened in 1942.136  He was, however, 
met with a barrage of pointed questions, including several about the draft.137  
One of those questions came from George Fujii, the twenty-nine-year-old Kibei 
whose arrest on false suspicion of involvement in the beating of Kay Nishimura 
in November of 1942 had led to the tumultuous Poston strike.138  Fujii wanted to 
know whether the restoration of the draft would come along with any of the 
other rights or privileges that the Nisei had lost.139  Fujii alluded in his question 
to the fact that while the Nisei were being asked to risk their lives for their 
country on battlefields in Europe, they were still not permitted to step foot in 
 
 130. See id. at 1. 
 131. See id. at 4. 
 132. See MULLER, supra note 3, at 71-72. 
 133. See Rowley to Succeed Haas, POSTON CHRON., Feb. 1, 1944, at 1. 
 134. See MYER, supra note 26, at 87; Nishimoto Diary, Entry of Feb. 17, 1944, at 2, supra note 51, at 
Reel 236, Frame 196. 
 135. See Nishimoto Diary, Entry of Jan. 27, 1944, at 1 supra note 51, at Reel 236, Frame 128. 
 136. See id. at 1-3. 
 137. See id. at 3-7. 
 138. See id. at 5.  For more on the Poston strike, see supra notes 43-58 and accompanying text. 
 139. See Nishimoto Diary, Entry of Jan. 27, 1944, at 5, supra note 51, at Reel 236, Frame 128. 
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California.  According to the diary of Richard Nishimoto, a Poston internee, 
Myer replied that he “could not answer this question because he did not 
know.”140  Then, misinterpreting the question as supportive of the draft, Myer 
bragged that the draft was “one of th[e] things for . . .[which he] had been fight-
ing.”141 
This response, and the draft situation generally, did not sit well with George 
Fujii.  Fujii was a soft-spoken, well-liked man who strongly opposed the eviction 
and incarceration of the Nikkei142 but who had nonetheless held a number of 
elective leadership positions while at Poston and who generally worked con-
structively with both his fellow internees and the administration.143  The draft, 
however, seems to have pushed Fujii beyond his limits, and he decided to speak 
out about it.  He wrote the following statement, which was mimeographed and 
posted throughout camp on February 6, 1944: 
TO THE GENTLEMEN OF 17 YEARS TO 38 YEARS OF AGE 
As you know fellow Americans, at last they did recognize and realize that we are 
Americans.  We are going to be drafted soon, just like an American outside enjoying 
the freedom and liberty.  But, don’t you think they should reconsider the steps that 
they had taken? 
As we believe that Mr. Roosevelt’s speech at the Congress was not merely an excuse 
to draft us to soldier’s and die in vain, we are demanding the following as an American 
Citizen: 
(1) Personal apology from Gen. DeWitt regarding his statement “Jap is Jap” and be 
expelled from his office.  We also want apology from Mayor Bowron and Gov. War-
ren, and American Legion of Cal. 
(2) Freedom, Rights and Privileges should not be denied in California, militarily, eco-
nomically, and politically. 
(3) Open the barb-wire and withdraw the Guard-duty of M.P. 
(4) Such signs as “No Jap,” “You Rat,” “No Orientals or Colored admitted” and etc. 
which were familiar in California, must be taken down throughout the U.S.A. 
(5) No discrimination upon the Japanese securing occupations. 
(6) Every opportunity must be given to the Japanese soldier for advancement in the 
Air Corps, in the Army, and in the Marine Corps. 
(7) Japanese soldier must be mixed with other Caucasian soldier to fight side by side. 
VOICE OF NISEI144 
Despite its grammatical troubles, Fujii’s document was a careful piece of writ-
ing.  He was careful to express support for the draft, and took the draft as an 
 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Nikkei refers to persons with any degree of Japanese ancestry living in the United States.  Estes 
& Estes, supra note 64, at n.1. 
 143. See Personality Study, George S. Fujii (Oct. 2, 1943) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Di-
vision of Rare and Manuscripts Collection, Cornell Univ. Library, Japanese-American Relocation Cen-
ter Records, #3830, Box 12). 
 144. Nishimoto Diary, Entry of Feb. 6, 1944, at 2, supra note 51, at Reel 236, Frame 154. 
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opportunity to call for the restoration of other rights and the correction of other 
wrongs.  He did not call for the Nisei not to comply with their induction notices. 
Poston responded approvingly to Fujii’s circular.145  An Issei woman, reading 
the message on a bulletin board, was heard to say, “That is fine.  The person 
expresses the truth courageously.”146  An Issei man correctly inferred that the 
author was a Kibei: “Yes, it looks like a Kibei’s work.  It takes a Kibei to have 
spunk enough to do something like this.”  An elected councilman, however, 
thought that it presented good ideas, but might not be effective: “That is al[l][ ] 
right,” he said, “but what good does it do?  The Niseis should get together and 
form a resolution and present it formally to Washington.”147 
But some young men already were getting together.  On the night of Febru-
ary 10, 1944, a group of Nisei, most of them Kibei, met in Poston’s Unit III to 
discuss the draft.148  According to Nishimoto, they agreed at that meeting that 
they would refuse to go into the army when they received their induction no-
tices.  They insisted that they were willing to go to jail for their decision.149 
The next night, another mimeographed notice appeared throughout camp.150  
This one pressed further than the first “Voice of the Nisei” circular.  It reported 
that the Nisei were “loyal and willing to serve and bear arms at any time to pro-
tect the precious rights bestowed upon us.”151  It emphasized that the Nisei had 
“been taught and reared from tender youth the Democratic principles of our 
Government—a heritage well worth being proud of—which allow us the free-
doms not granted in any other country.”152  And it repeated the complaint that 
the Nisei had been stripped of their rights as citizens.153  But at the end, in all 
capital letters, the notice urged that “until such time as all the wrong has been 
righted and adequate compensation made, we, the Niseis, should not be com-
pelled to bear arms; and to such date as our status is definitely established as to 
what right and privilege we are fighting for.”154 
Perhaps emboldened by the favorable camp reaction to the earlier circular, 
the authors of this notice—one of whom was George Fujii155—pushed a bit 
closer to the edge of the law.  The notice praised the draft, to be sure, but it also 
came closer than had the circular to suggesting that the Nisei refuse to be 
drafted until their rights were restored.  It ultimately avoided explicit encour-
 
 145. See Reaction to “Voice of the Nisei” No. 1 on Selective Service (Feb. 10, 1944), microformed 
on Community Analysis Reports, Reel 10, supra note 77. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Nishimoto Diary, Entry of Feb. 11, 1944, at 2-3, supra note 51, at Reel 236, Frame 169. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Nishimoto Diary, Entry of Feb. 12, 1944, at 3, supra note 51, at Reel 236, Frame 173. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See id. 
 154. Id. at 4. 
 155. See Nishimoto Diary, Entry of June 19, 1944, at 3, supra note 51, at Reel 237, Frame 88. 
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agement of draft resistance, however, by arguing that the government ought not 
enforce the law rather than that the Nisei ought not follow it. 
This second notice caused alarm.  Block managers worried that the last lines 
of the notice were seditious, and they resented that it had been posted on offi-
cial bulletin boards.156  Their supervisor directed that the notice be taken down 
throughout camp.157  A couple of days later, the camp administration’s internal 
security officers went around camp taking down any remaining notices.158  In-
ternee leaders were called in to a conference with the camp’s top administrators 
and “admonished to prevent [a] recurrence” of the notices in camp. 
Like many protest movements, however, this one moved beyond the point 
at which its originators might have wished it to stop.  On February 15, 1944, a 
third mimeographed notice was surreptitiously circulated by hand in camp.  
This one, with which George Fujii maintained he had had nothing to do,159 was 
quite blunt: 
NISEIS OF DRAFTABLE AGE 
BACK THE VOICE OF NISEIS WHICH HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED. 
Those of you who have received notices for pre-induction physical. 
Cooperate and refuse to go until we have reached our goal.  (Fighting for our rights) 
Niseis of all Poston Camp will back you in your demand for the rights which we right-
fully deserve. 
We must receive such rights or we will have nothing to fight for. 
Those who do not care for their rights and are willing to be drafted, please wait until 
our rights are granted or until we are all branded as Pro-Axis elements.  Then volun-
teer to show loyalty. 
BACK OUR FIGHT FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.160 
For many internees at Poston, this handbill pushed too far.  Many worried that 
an overt call to “refuse to go” when called for induction was illegal and wanted 
nothing to do with it.161 
Cooler heads among internee leaders quickly decided that Poston needed a 
more appropriate vent for angry feelings about the draft, and needed it quickly.  
On February 17, a number of Kibei asked the internee Executive Board for 
permission to hold a mass meeting of the Nisei in Poston’s Unit I, to ratify a 
resolution calling for the restoration of Nisei rights.162  Initially, the board was 
reluctant, but the sponsors of the meeting persuaded the board that this was not 
a subversive effort.163  They then took the request to the camp’s white adminis-
 
 156. See Nishimoto Diary, Entry of Feb. 12, 1944, at 4, supra note 51, at Reel 236, Frame 173. 
 157. See id. at 5. 
 158. See Nishimoto Diary, Entry of Feb. 15, 1944, at 1, supra note 51, at Reel 236, Frame 183. 
 159. Nishimoto Diary, Entry of Feb. 25, 1944, at 5, supra note 51, at Reel 236, Frame 228. 
 160. Nishimoto Diary, Entry of Feb. 16, 1944, at 2-3, supra note 51, at Reel 236, Frame 191. 
 161. See id. at 3. 
 162. See Nishimoto Diary, Entry of Feb. 18, 1944, supra note 51, at Reel 236, Frame 201. 
 163. See id. at 4. 
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trators, who also needed to be persuaded that the meeting was not designed to 
produce a subversive or seditious resolution.164  Once they were persuaded of 
this, the meeting went off at two in the afternoon on February 19 under the 
sponsorship of the Selective Service Advisory Committee, a joint administra-
tion-internee board that had been hastily set up to oversee the draft at Poston.165  
It was a brilliant piece of politics.  With internee leaders and administration of-
ficials on the dais, internees asked many questions about the draft, only some of 
which the advisory board could answer.  Then, on a show of hands, those in at-
tendance endorsed a mild resolution calling—much as George Fujii’s first circu-
lar had done—for the simultaneous return of the Nisei’s civil rights with the re-
turn of selective service.166  Camp officials and internee leaders undoubtedly left 
the meeting feeling that they had managed to defuse a potentially volatile situa-
tion. 
Within a few hours, however, Poston again risked chaos.  At 5:30 in the af-
ternoon, FBI agents arrested George Fujii on a charge of sedition for his role in 
the “Voice of the Nisei” circulars.167  At 9:00 that night, the Project Director 
convened an emergency meeting of his top legal administrative staff and the in-
ternee leadership to deal with the crisis that he feared would unfold when the 
camp awoke the next morning to learn that a very popular figure had been ar-
rested for demanding Nisei civil rights.168  The administrators feared another 
strike.169  All of the internees at the meeting, however, agreed that no distur-
bance was likely, 170 especially if the situation was well-managed, and they turned 
out to be right.171  The Project Director astutely noted that Fujii’s arrest would 
likely make people afraid to support the mild petition that had been adopted 
that afternoon with his approval, and he asked that the internee leadership re-
assure the camp’s population that they could sign the approved petition without 
fearing prosecution.172  This reassurance was needed because many internees 
were indeed reluctant to affix their names to any statement on the draft after 
seeing the government’s reaction to the “Voice of the Nisei” circulars.173  But 
eventually, 954 out of about 1,900 draft-age men signed the petition.174 
 
 164. See Selective Service: Nisei administration worker (Feb. 19, 1944), microformed on Community 
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 166. See Nishimoto Diary, Entry of Feb. 19, 1944, at 1-3, supra note 51, at Reel 236, Frame 206. 
 167. See Nishimoto Diary, Entry of Feb. 20, 1944, at 1, supra note 51, at Reel 236, Frame 208. 
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Philip M. Glick, Solicitor, War Relocation Authority 2 (Feb. 26, 1944), supra note 51, at Reel 196, 
Frame 38. 
 172. See  Nishimoto Diary, Entry of Feb. 19, 1944, at 10, supra note 51, at Reel 236, Frame 206. 
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08_MULLER_FIXED PROOFS.DOC 11/22/2005  11:34 AM 
140 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 68:119 
Overwhelming support was also soon forthcoming for George Fujii, who 
was in jail in Phoenix.  A private committee was formed about a week after Fu-
jii’s arrest to raise money for his defense.175  It was composed largely of elected 
internee leaders and block managers and had the support of the camp’s admini-
stration.  A Nisei attorney from the Project Attorney’s Office predicted that be-
cause of anti-Japanese prejudice in the Arizona jury pool, Fujii would need 
funds not just for bail and a trial, but also for an appeal.176  The Committee 
therefore set a fundraising goal of $2,000.177  Some internees complained about 
this effort, contending that Fujii had caused too much trouble in camp and that 
the “Voice of the Nisei” circulars did not reflect their views.178  Some were also 
afraid that the FBI would see a contribution to Fujii’s defense as obstruction of 
justice or sedition.179  According to Richard Nishimoto, many internees were 
“afraid of the FBI more than any reasonable person [could] imagine.”180  In the 
end, though, the outpouring of support for Fujii was overwhelming.  By early 
April, the Friends of George Fujii Committee had collected the incredible sum 
of $3,262.20 from all three of the Poston units.181 
Scott Rowley, Poston’s new Project Attorney, told his superiors in Washing-
ton that he thought the Fujii case bore careful watching, as it was “somewhat of 
a test case to determine the limits within which any criticism or comments on 
selective service may be made by evacuees.”182  And this was certainly how 
Poston’s residents took it.  According to Nishimoto, internees understood that 
the FBI took Fujii out of camp so quickly because “they were anxious to put a 
stop to the rapidly growing agitation against the draft.”183  The FBI’s strategy 
worked.  After Fujii’s arrest, Nishimoto reported that discussion and debate 
about the draft decreased markedly.  Writing on March 11, Nishimoto observed 
that “there is no organised [sic] resistance to the progress of the Nisei draft,” 
and “no attempt by anyone to influence others to resist induction.”184  The most 
one heard was “grumblings here and there, but they [did] not amount to any-
thing.”185 
That the talk of resistance subsided did not mean that resistance itself dis-
appeared.  In fact, on the morning of March 19, 1944, when the first session of 
preinduction physical examinations began, fifteen young men out of 230 were 
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not there.186  The camp’s internal security director went to find the missing Nisei, 
and succeeded in talking six of the fifteen into showing up.187  Nine, however—
none of them Kibei188—refused to go,189 and some of them belligerently told the 
internal security director to go to hell.190  The resisters expected to be picked up 
and taken to jail that day, but they were not. 191  Instead, they hung around camp 
for a few days, while a top camp administrator met with each one to try and 
persuade him to change his mind.192  They were, however, unmovable.193  On 
March 25, 1944, FBI agents came to Poston, rounded them up, handcuffed 
them, and carted them off in three big sedans to a Phoenix jail.194  They were 
joined late in April by an additional young man who refused to appear for his 
physical examination when another 158 were called in mid-April.195 
No public outcry ensued when these first ten resisters were arrested.  Ac-
cording to Nishimoto, Poston was “sitting back and watching what would hap-
pen” to the resisters.196  He reported two general views on those resisting the 
draft.  One group, which Nishimoto labeled “a small portion” of camp residents, 
saw the resisters as “courageous and noble in their attempts to express their 
grievances in this way.”197  Another group, however, which Nishimoto saw as 
larger, “condemn[ed those attempts] as false and unnecessary bravado, which 
would injure the future of the Japanese in this country.”198  Resistance was, in 
any case, relatively modest at this point in 1944:  of the 481 young men called 
for preinduction physicals, only ten had not complied. 
Each of those ten resisters pled guilty late in March to a single count of will-
fully failing to report for a preinduction physical examination in violation of 50 
U.S.C.S App. § 311 (1942). 199  The judge, David Ling, was an Arizona native 
who had served as both county attorney and a state superior court judge in the 
mining-dominated town of Clifton, Arizona,200 before being appointed to the 
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federal bench by Franklin Roosevelt in 1936.  According to Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor, who knew and practiced before Judge Ling, he was an unpretentious 
and taciturn man who handled all of Arizona’s federal caseload and maintained 
a reputation as an excellent trial judge.201  Ling sentenced each of the resisters to 
three years’ incarceration, and they were sent off to the medium-security La 
Tuna federal prison near El Paso, Texas, to serve their time.202  Thus, by April of 
1944, draft resistance at Poston appeared to be finished.  George Fujii was 
awaiting trial on sedition charges for speaking out against the draft, and the 
handful of Nisei who had refused the draft were in federal prison serving 
lengthy sentences.  Scott Rowley ventured a guess in his April 8 report to WRA 
headquarters that the movement against the draft at Poston had “burned itself 
out.”203 
Rowley was wrong.  In fact, draft resistance at Poston had barely gotten 
started.  In late April and May, five more young men refused to appear for their 
physicals.204  They were arrested on May 27, 1944, but unlike the earlier ten, 
most of them were released on bail and returned to camp to await trial.205  Row-
ley took their return as an opportunity to interview them about their reasons for 
resisting the draft and to persuade them to change their minds.206  The young 
men were at first reluctant to talk, but eventually opened up and revealed their 
thinking to the lawyer.  Rowley’s impressions capture well the anger and confu-
sion that the young men were experiencing: 
I believe, that in all cases, they are intelligent, well-meaning boys, who are unsettled 
and confused about their rights and their status as citizens and who have exaggerated 
feelings of discrimination. . . .  I doubt very much if any of them will be dangerous to 
our national security or that they have any real feeling of loyalty to Japan; and if they 
can be straightened out in their mental attitude, they may become good soldiers and 
good citizens.207 
Rowley expressed his “hope that they [would] change their attitude and decide 
to accept service in the army rather than to go to prison for years.”208  But none 
of them changed his mind. 
Indeed, within just a few weeks, Poston was in a headlong rush into large-
scale draft resistance that caught the camp’s administrators by surprise.209  On 
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June 18, 1944, fifteen out of sixty-five Nisei refused induction.210  On June 28, 
twenty-one out of seventy-eight refused.211  In mid-July, it was three out of 
twenty-nine.212  In mid-August, fourteen out of fifty-seven refused induction.213  
In late September, in a carefully staged act of defiance, seven out of thirty-five 
Nisei simultaneously said “no!” when the soldier in charge told the group to 
raise their right hands to be sworn in.214  On October 30, eleven out of thirty-six 
refused.215  When all was said and done, over one hundred young men at Poston 
resisted the draft. 
It is difficult to specify exactly what happened at Poston in the summer and 
fall of 1944 to rekindle resistance to the draft after it had nearly been snuffed 
out.  Several factors, however, undoubtedly emboldened the Nisei.  The most 
important event was George Fujii’s sedition trial in early June.  Although his 
supporters had raised enough money to pay for the appeal that they imagined 
would be necessary after a conviction by a biased jury, the case never even went 
to the jury.  Fujii admitted involvement in the first two “Voice of the Nisei” cir-
culars, but federal judge David Ling found those to be non-seditious as a matter 
of law.216  Not surprisingly in light of its open call for defiance of the draft, Ling 
deemed the third circular seditious, but the government offered no evidence 
that linked Fujii to its preparation or distribution.217  Judge Ling therefore 
granted a defense motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, and Fujii was re-
leased to return to Poston.218  While no document reporting the Poston commu-
nity’s reactions to Fujii’s acquittal survives,  some in camp undoubtedly took it 
as a vindication of Fujii for speaking out against the draft and perhaps even as 
an endorsement of his criticisms.  It probably was not mere coincidence that the 
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number of draft resisters at Poston spiked upward for the first time just after 
George Fujii was acquitted of sedition for speaking out against the draft. 
Another circumstance that spurred young men to resist was the encouraging 
presence in camp of other resisters.  The first ten young men who resisted the 
draft in March and April were immediately arrested and detained until they en-
tered guilty pleas, and then sent off to prison to serve their sentences.219  Starting 
in June, however, the pattern changed.  Friends began getting the money to-
gether to post bail for the young men, and most returned to camp from Phoenix 
just a day after their arrest.  According to the Project Attorney, these friends 
wanted them returned to camp so that they could persuade the resisters to 
change their minds and submit to induction.220  But it did not work out that way.  
Not only did they not change their minds, but the resisters began persuading 
other young men to join them.221  And with each new crop of resisters who re-
turned to camp on bail, the ranks of the defiant in camp grew, as did their influ-
ence.222  These young men also now had George Fujii, the David who slew Goli-
ath, back among them.  Fujii was seen on several occasions conferring with 
groups of young Nisei, telling them that it was unconstitutional to draft the Ni-
sei out of the camps.223 
Additional encouragement to the Poston resistance undoubtedly came from 
the ruling in July of 1944 in a case involving the draft resisters from the Tule 
Lake Segregation Center.  In United States v. Kuwabara,224 Louis E. Goodman, a 
United States District Judge for the Northern District of California, dismissed 
the draft evasion prosecutions brought against twenty-six Tule Lake internees 
on the grounds that it was shocking to the conscience and a violation of due 
process to incarcerate a person on account of ancestry, draft him into the army, 
and then prosecute him for resisting.225  While the news of the verdicts in other 
cases of Nisei resistance in the summer and fall of 1944 was grim, this surprise 
victory for the Tule Lake Nisei undoubtedly gave heart to those contemplating 
resistance at Poston, especially those who, like most of the Tule Lake resisters, 
had filed requests for expatriation from the United States. 
Finally, the resistance at Poston was buoyed by significant (albeit not 
unanimous) support from the Poston internee community.  This support never 
found voice in any official or mass action by internees or their elective represen-
tatives, but evidence of it can nonetheless be found in the surviving archival 
sources.  For example, in June of 1944, after George Fujii’s unexpected acquit-
 
 219. See supra notes 194-195, 202 and accompanying text. 
 220. Letter from Scott Rowley to Philip M. Glick, at 1, supra note 51, at Reel 196. 
 221. See Letter from Scott Rowley to Philip M. Glick (June 26, 1944), at 1-2, supra note 51, at Reel 
196. 
 222. The Poston experience shows the wisdom (if not the fairness) of the approach taken at other 
camps, where draft resisters were denied bail pending trial in order to keep them out of camp.  See 
MULLER, supra note 3, at 75-76 (Minidoka), 88-89 (Heart Mountain). 
 223. See Nishimoto Diary, Entry of June 24, 1944, at 4, supra note 51, at Reel 237, Frame 100. 
 224. 56 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. Cal. 1944). 
 225. See id. at 719. 
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tal on sedition charges, the Friends of George Fujii Committee had to decide 
what to do with the more than one-thousand-dollar surplus left in the fund they 
had raised.226  Several members of the committee argued “vociferously” that 
they should send the money to the draft resisters at the Heart Mountain Relo-
cation Center to help them fight the criminal charges they faced.227  The pro-
posal was ultimately defeated due to the objections of several committee mem-
bers who felt the committee was bound to return the money pro rata to its 
donors.228  However, the strongly voiced proposal reveals both that there was 
support in camp for draft resistance in June of 1944 and that at least some saw a 
clear connection between the cause of George Fujii—a cause that had been 
popular beyond anyone’s expectations—and the cause of young men who were 
resisting the draft. 
In early July of 1944, Project Attorney Rowley made an appearance before 
the Community Council to appeal for their help in “curb[ing] the increasing 
wave of selective service violators.”229  The lawyer may have hoped for their co-
operation, but, in the words of Nishimoto, his appeal “boomeranged on him.”230  
The council members responded with strong support for the resisters.  Many on 
the council told Rowley that “it was natural that there were many violators be-
cause [the Nisei] did not know what they were going to fight for.”231  To draft the 
Nisei was to demand that they “sacrifice their lives in vain.”232  Other council 
members complained that the Nisei really could never feel like American sol-
diers so long as the military discriminated against them by placing them in a 
segregated unit.233  Again, the council members’ comments suggest broad empa-
thy at Poston for the position of the Nisei who resisted the draft. 
Later in July, some of the resisters came very close to winning the open sup-
port of the council in Poston’s Unit I.  Several young resisters who were back in 
camp on bail appeared before the council and made a plea for financial sup-
port.234  The young men explained that they needed around $2,000 to retain 
counsel to represent the Nisei who were resisting the draft.235  Their pitch to the 
council was touching: 
We are fighting for all the Japanese. . . .  We would rather go to jail and forget about 
everything.  But that would not be good for others.  We should leave in the record that 
the Japanese in every relocation center protested to the reinstitution of [the] Nisei 
draft while detained in the centers.  We know we don’t have any chance of winning 
 
 226. Money raised to defray the costs of an appeal was not needed because Fujii was acquitted at 
trial.  See supra notes 216-218 and accompanying text. 
 227. Nishimoto Diary, Entry of June 19, 1944, at 3, supra note 51, at Reel 237, Frame 88. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Nishimoto Diary, Entry of July 5, 1944, at 4, supra note 51, at Reel 237, Frame 132. 
 230. Id. at 5. 
 231. Id. at 4. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. See Nishimoto Diary, Entry of July 19, 1944, at 4-6, supra note 51, at Reel 237, Frame 165.  
(Page 4 of this document is misnumbered as a duplicative page 5). 
 235. See id. at 6. 
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our case, but that’s not the point.  If we file enough cases from all over, the court 
might decide to listen to our plea in the end.236 
Many on the council greeted the proposal enthusiastically.  One block manager 
thought that block meetings should be called throughout Poston that evening to 
discuss the proposal; he was sure that there were “people willing to help in the 
cause.”237  Another leader announced that the proposal was “a very good idea,” 
because “it would bring out the injustice of drafting the Nisei from these ‘deten-
tion’ camp[s].”238  The proposal failed that evening only because Richard Nishi-
moto, who opposed the resisters, outmaneuvered those on the council who sup-
ported them.239 
Draft resistance at Poston thus had a number of important triggers and sup-
ports in the summer and fall of 1944.  Yet it also encountered skepticism and 
opposition that kept it from capturing and dominating the camp’s political life 
as the Fair Play Committee did for a time at the Heart Mountain Relocation 
Center in Wyoming in the spring of 1944.240  Some of this opposition came from 
those who simply believed in military service for the Nisei as a categorical mat-
ter.  This view was reflected in the comments of a young Nisei woman to a rep-
resentative of Poston’s community analysis section on July 12, 1944.  “I be-
lieve,” she said, 
that all the [N]isei boys should be willing to fight for their country.  It is true that all of 
us have been mistreated after the onset of this conflict but right now all of us are living 
in America.  We are citizens of this country and so we should try our best to protect 
our land from any form of aggression.241 
For adherents of this view about the draft, nothing about the resisters’ motives 
would likely have persuaded them to support the resistance. 
Others, however, had doubts about the motives of the resisters.  The doubts 
were not so much about whether some of the resisters were expressing loyalty 
to Japan by refusing to go into the army.  There is only sketchy evidence in the 
historical record to support such a notion.242  Rather, what some doubted was 
that the resistance was actually grounded in a defense of Nisei civil liberties as 
opposed to a simple desire to avoid the dangers of the battlefield. 
For these doubts, as to some of those who resisted, the record does provide 
support.  The first reactions of the Nisei as a group to the announcement of the 
 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. See id. at 7. 
 240. See MULLER, supra note 3, at 76-89 (describing the successes of the Fair Play Committee, a po-
litical group organized by internees that encouraged the eighty-five draft resisters at Heart Mountain). 
 241. Draft: Nisei Girl (July 12, 1944), microformed on Community Analysis Reports, Reel 10, supra 
note 77. 
 242. See, e.g., Meeting of Leave Clearance Board: Camp III (Mar. 15, 1944), microformed on Com-
munity Analysis Reports, Reel 10, supra note 77 (“One [leave clearance] board member reported that 
seven out of ten [applicants for expatriation and repatriation] that he had questioned in regard to 
whether or not they would serve in the Japanese army against the United States replied that they 
would.”). 
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reinstatement of the draft were to try to escape it through relocation or expa-
triation,243 not to try to fight it as a deprivation of their rights.  Nishimoto’s ob-
servation was that many of the resisters were “boys [who were] afraid to be 
killed in war,” who could not be persuaded to serve by “argu[ments] about [the] 
virtues of serving for [their] own country.”244  Project Attorney Rowley shared 
this impression of the resistance at Poston.  After interviewing a number of the 
young men who refused to report for induction on June 18, 1944, Rowley re-
ported that he had: 
a very strong impression that their refusal to be inducted is caused by a mixture of rea-
sons, one being a resentment at what they consider unjustified discrimination, and the 
other being . . . a desire to evade military service, and it seems to me that the first rea-
son has been developed considerably as an excuse for the second.245 
Rowley was careful to note that “[t]his [was] undoubtedly not true in all cases 
but, like citizens of any other ancestry, there are certain ones affected who 
would go almost any length rather than go into the armed forces.”246  And per-
haps most significantly, even some of the resisters themselves drew distinctions 
among those who were resisting on civil rights grounds and those who were not.  
When representatives of the resisters appeared before the Unit I council in mid-
July to ask the council to underwrite their legal fees, they asked for support 
only for the subset of resisters who had not asked for expatriation.247  These dif-
fering views showed that the draft resistance at Poston was a mixed and am-
biguous phenomenon, encompassing a range of motives. 
V 
UNITED STATES V. HIDEICHI TAKEGUMA ET AL. 
This phenomenon dragged on longer than at any of the other camps because 
with the charged men all at liberty—or at least what passed for liberty behind 
the barbed wire at Poston—there was little pressure to bring their cases to trial.  
It was not until mid-March of 1945 that grand jury indictments were finally re-
turned in the cases of the nearly one hundred Nisei who had refused induction 
over the preceding year.248  The indictments charged each of them with a single 
count of failing and refusing to report for induction when duly ordered to do so 
under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, in violation of section 311 
of Title 50 of the United States Code.249 
 
 243. See supra notes 126-131 and accompanying text. 
 244. Nishimoto Diary, Entry of June 26, 1944, at 1, supra note 51, at Reel 237, Frame 104. 
 245. Letter from Scott Rowley to Philip M. Glick (June 26, 1944), at 1, supra note 51, at Reel 196. 
 246. Id. 
 247. See Nishimoto Diary, Entry of July 19, 1944, at 5, supra note 51, at Reel 237, Frame 165. 
 248. See Letter from Scott Rowley, Project Attorney, Colorado River War Relocation Center, to 
Edwin E. Ferguson, Solicitor, War Relocation Authority 3 (Mar. 12, 1945), supra note 51, at Reel 196, 
Frame 169. 
 249. See Brief on Behalf of the United States at 1, Takeguma v. United States, 156 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 
1946) (No. 11079) (on file with NARA-Pacific Alaska Region, San Francisco, CA, United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, RG 276, Box 4347). 
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During the year that lapsed between the first arrests of resisters at Poston 
and their indictment, the staff of the Project Attorney’s Office had tried hard to 
persuade the resisters to change their minds, but those efforts were successful in 
only three cases.250  The resisters had retained a prominent civil liberties lawyer, 
A.L. Wirin, to represent them.251  Wirin had tried to persuade his clients to 
abandon their challenge to induction in favor of accepting induction and then 
challenging the application of the draft to them by writ of habeas corpus.252  The 
resisters, however, could not be dissuaded from the course they had chosen. 
Unlike the litigation in most of the other federal districts where young Nisei 
challenged the draft,253 the litigation before Judge Ling in the District of Arizona 
proceeded quickly, smoothly, and entirely by agreement of the parties.  With 
nearly one hundred pending cases, defense attorney Wirin and federal prosecu-
tor Frank E. Flynn decided that it would be most efficient to identify and try 
three cases that typified the three scenarios under which the defendants had re-
sisted the draft at Poston.254  They chose the cases of Hideichi Takeguma, who 
had refused to submit to induction without filing a request for expatriation; 
Kingo Tajii, who had been ordered to report for induction after filing a request 
for expatriation but before the government responded to the expatriation re-
quest by ordering Tajii excluded and segregated; and Yasuto Fujioka, who had 
been ordered to report for induction after both his expatriation request and a 
government order of exclusion and segregation.255  All of the other resisters 
signed a stipulation that they would await the outcome of these three men’s tri-
als and appeals and submit themselves to whatever outcome the trial and appel-
late process produced.256  As a result, their cases were placed in a kind of sus-
pended animation while Judge Ling moved ahead in the cases of Takeguma, 
Tajii, and Fujioka. 
 
 250. See id.; Letter from Scott Rowley, Project Attorney, Colorado River War Relocation Center, to 
Edwin M. Ferguson, Solicitor, War Relocation Authority 1-2 (Apr. 14, 1945), supra note 51, at Reel 
196, Frame 179. 
 251. See Letter from Scott Rowley to Philip M. Glick, at 1, supra note 51, at Reel 196.  Wirin was a 
Los Angeles attorney who handled many high-profile cases as counsel to the Southern California 
Branch of the American Civil Liberties Union and as counsel to the Japanese American Citizens 
League.  See MULLER, supra note 3, at 115. 
 252. See Letter from Scott Rowley to Philip M. Glick, at 1, supra note 51, at Reel 196.  Wirin’s was 
undoubtedly sound advice.  In Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1944), the Supreme Court held that 
the Selective Training and Service Act of 1944 did not authorize judicial review of a selective service 
board’s classification of an individual in the context of a criminal prosecution for violation of an order 
to report for a particular kind of wartime service.  Falbo, while potentially distinguishable from the 
situation of the Poston resisters, certainly did not augur well for their chances before Judge Ling. 
 253. See MULLER, supra note 3, at 101-14 (trial of Heart Mountain resisters in the District of Wyo-
ming), 124-30 (trial of Minidoka resisters in the District of Idaho), 131-41 (proceedings against Tule 
Lake resisters in the Northern District of California). 
 254. See Brief on Behalf of the United States, supra note 249, at 2. 
 255. See id. at 2-3. 
 256. See Stipulation, United States v. Ben Yumen et al., (D. Ariz. Apr. 23, 1945) (on file with 
NARA-Pacific Region, Laguna Niguel, CA), supra note 8, at Criminal Case No. 7071-7127, Box 182, 
Nos. C-7071 Phx. - C-7191 Phx. passim). 
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In April of 1945, defense lawyer Wirin filed a motion to quash the indict-
ments on a variant of the theory that had led Judge Goodman to dismiss the 
charges against the Tule Lake resisters.257  Judge Goodman had held in United 
States v. Kuwabara that the prosecution of incarcerated Japanese Americans for 
resisting the draft was shocking to his conscience and therefore a violation of 
due process.258  Wirin stripped Goodman’s reasoning of its constitutional under-
pinnings and argued instead that in the Selective Training and Service Act of 
1940, Congress had not intended that American citizens imprisoned on account 
of their Japanese ancestry would “be subject additionally to involuntary im-
pressments into military service.”259  Wirin supported the motion with affidavits 
from Takeguma, Tajii, and Fujiota that related the circumstances of their evic-
tion from their West Coast homes and their incarceration at Poston.  Fujioka, 
for example, averred that his parents were “looked upon as enemies, fugitives 
and saboteurs, . . . [e]ven after several decades of hardships and struggles to es-
tablish themselves as respectful residents,” and that because of “this ordeal, 
[his] mother ha[d] been seriously taken ill by the unaccustomed hardship 
brought upon her.”260  As for himself, Fujioka stated that he “ha[d] been man-
handled and . . . made to dwell in a location unfit for human inhabitance.”261  He 
and Kingo Tajii both alleged that they had applied for expatriation and had 
been placed on Poston’s “stop list”—its list of individuals who were not permit-
ted to leave the camp for any reason—in lieu of being transported to the Tule 
Lake Segregation Center, which had run out of room.262 
Judge Ling denied the motion to quash the indictment without a recorded 
opinion.263  The case then moved to trial, and promptly, because Wirin and 
Flynn agreed to forego the usual adversarial process of presenting witnesses and 
physical evidence, and instead submitted the case for bench trial on a set of 
stipulated facts.264  Those stipulated facts included the bare essentials:  that each 
of the three men was an American citizen of Japanese ancestry, that each had 
been moved by the military from the West Coast to Poston, that each had been 
ordered to report for induction, and that each had failed to do so.265  Judge Ling 
took the case under advisement, and two weeks later announced his judgment 
 
 257. See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 2-3, Takeguma v. United States, 156 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1946) 
(No. 11079) (on file with NARA-Pacific Alaska Region, San Francisco, CA), United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, RG 276, Box 4347); Move for Quashing of 97 Indictments, PHOENIX 
GAZETTE, Apr. 24, 1945, § 2, at 3. 
 258. See 56 F. Supp. 716, 719 (N.D. Cal. 1944). 
 259. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 257, at 7. 
 260. Id. at 5. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 3-5.  Because the government had granted their petitions for expatriation, Fujioka and 
Tajii were both under Justice Department detention as alien enemies at the Santa Fe, New Mexico De-
tention Center by the time their cases reached the Court of Appeals.  Id. at 2. 
 263. Judge Ling liked to boast that he was not one to write opinions.  “That is what the Ninth Cir-
cuit is there for,” he would tell counsel.  See O’Connor, supra note 200, at 3. 
 264. See Brief on Behalf of the United States, supra note 249, at 2. 
 265. Id. at 2-3. 
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convicting the men of the crime with which they had been charged.266  On June 
18, 1945, he sentenced them to prison terms of one year. 267 
It was an odd sentence.  Just fourteen months earlier, Judge Ling had sen-
tenced the first ten Poston resisters, all of whom had pled guilty, to prison terms 
of three years.  Because Judge Ling did not explain his sentencing decision, it is 
impossible to know for sure why Judge Ling saw the Poston resisters as less cul-
pable in June of 1945 than he had in March of 1944.  But several reasons suggest 
themselves.  By June of 1945, the Allies had already won the war in Europe and 
an Allied victory in the Pacific was a foregone conclusion.  Poston and the rest 
of the WRA’s relocation centers were either closed or on their way to closing.268  
The West Coast had been reopened to loyal Japanese Americans.269  And Judge 
Ling had had the additional experience of trying—and acquitting—George Fujii 
on very weak sedition charges for speaking out about the government’s mis-
treatment of Japanese Americans.  Perhaps Judge Ling was coming to see more 
complexity and nuance to the situation of the Nisei draft resisters than he had 
seen on a first impression. 
A.L. Wirin took an appeal of these three convictions to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  He built his argument around the claim 
that the government had treated the Nisei as if they were aliens.  “Although 
American citizens by birth,” Wirin wrote, “the defendants because of claimed 
war emergency have been treated as alien enemies, interned as prisoners of 
war, solely because we have been at war with the government where their ances-
tors were born.”270  Because the Nisei were constructive enemy aliens, Wirin ar-
gued, Congress could not have intended to draft them.  Picking up on one of the 
ideas in Judge Goodman’s decision in the case of the Tule Lake resisters271—
although not Judge Goodman’s constitutional rationale—Wirin argued 
that Congress did not intend, in the enactment of the Selective Training and Service 
Act, that persons treated as were the defendants, be nonetheless subject to military 
service; that denuded of essential rights of citizenship, such persons should still be sub-
ject to enforced military service—a duty traditionally, and heretofore deemed to be, 
an obligation of citizenship; and certainly not a duty ordinarily expected of alien ene-
mies.272 
 
 266. See 98 Jap-Americans Found Guilty of Draft Evasion, PHOENIX GAZETTE, June 5, 1945, §2, at 
1. 
 267. See Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 257, at 1-2. 
 268. The last internee departed Poston on November 28, 1945.  See BURTON ET AL., supra note 29, 
at 40. 
 269. See GREG ROBINSON, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT 227-32 (2001). 
 270. Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 257, at 6 (emphasis in original). 
 271. See United States v. Kuwabara, 56 F. Supp. 716, 719 (N.D. Cal. 1944) (arguing that Congress’ 
intention that those in a free and just society share the obligations of military duty in a fair and just sys-
tem is inconsistent with the defendants’ case since the defendants have been deprived of their due 
process rights). 
 272. Id. at 9. 
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Wirin asked the Ninth Circuit for a declaration that “under a proper construc-
tion of the legislative intent of Congress . . . , the defendants were not subject to 
induction in the armed forces.”273 
United States Attorney Flynn replied simply to Wirin’s claim.  The Selective 
Training and Service Act, Flynn argued, clearly stated that “every male citi-
zen . . . shall be liable for training and service in the land or naval forces of the 
United States.”274  While the law “contemplate[d] that certain persons may be 
unacceptable to the armed forces because of their allegiance to other na-
tions . . . and provide[d] that those persons shall be classified in III-C[,] . . . 
nothing in the regulations indicates that a person of draft age who is acceptable 
to the armed forces shall be deferred or exempted from military service” be-
cause of the claimed denial of their rights as citizens.275  Flynn had little to say 
about Judge Goodman’s contrary decision in the Tule Lake case; he maintained 
simply that it was “untenable.”276 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit made quick work of the appeals 
in United States v. Hideichi Takeguma et al.  All seven judges of the court 
agreed that the convictions of the Nisei resisters should be affirmed.277  The 
court treated the three appellants slightly differently.  As to Hideichi 
Takeguma, who never filed a petition for expatriation, the court stated bluntly 
that “[t]here is nothing whatever to any claim that the mere removal from the 
Pacific area (or confinement to any location), harsh as it was, should act to re-
lieve anyone from the necessity of serving in the military forces.”278  As to Kingo 
Tajii and Yasuto Fujioka, both of whom had requested expatriation, the court 
held that their attempt to establish that they were outside the reach of the Se-
lective Training and Service Act of 1940s was unavailing.  Even if they were 
constructive enemy aliens and no longer citizens, the court explained, the Selec-
tive Training and Service Act accorded the raw power to the military to con-
script even enemy aliens.279  Finally, the court cast aside Judge Goodman’s opin-
ion in the case of the Tule Lake resisters, stating that it was “not in accord with” 
that ruling.280 
One Ninth Circuit judge, however, broke ranks with his six colleagues in a 
modest but ultimately important way.  Judge William Denman filed a short 
concurring opinion in which he stepped out of his narrow judicial role to say 
that he thought these young men deserved a break.  Judge Denman shared with 
 
 273. Id. 
 274. Brief on Behalf of the United States, supra note 249, at 6 (quoting section 3 of the Selective 
Training and Service Act of 1940). 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. at 8. 
 277. The Ninth Circuit consisted of only seven judges in 1946.  See James R. Browning, Innovations 
of the Ninth Circuit, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 357, 357 (2000).  Thus the entire court heard and decided 
the Takeguma appeal. 
 278. United States v. Takeguma, 156 F.2d 437, 440 (9th Cir. 1946). 
 279. See id. 
 280. Id. at 441. 
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Judge Goodman a strong sense of outrage at the government’s mistreatment of 
the Nisei.281  “They were United States citizens,” Denman explained, who “only 
attempted to give up their citizenship after a continued illegal imprisonment by 
the Federal Government in barbed wire enclosures, guarded by armed soldiers, 
under conditions of great oppression and humiliation.”282  Of all of the many 
words written by judges about the Japanese American incarceration during that 
era, these are among the harshest.283 
But then Denman framed the issue more personally, and more movingly: 
Had any one of us been so wrongfully imprisoned in our youth because our parents 
had emigrated to this country from, say, Germany, England, or Ireland, with which 
there might be a war, it cannot be said that our exasperation and shame would not 
have caused us to prefer the citizenship of our parents’ homeland.  It was because the 
United States first cruelly wronged us by an illegal if not criminal imprisonment that 
our renunciation came.  Even if, in our justifiable resentment, we committed acts ad-
verse to the continuance of the war against our fatherland, it is for the United States, 
the first and greater wrongdoer, to be merciful.  Because our skins are white and our 
origin is European, is no ground for distinction between our youth and that of these 
appellants.284 
Denman’s statement did not bring him to the conclusion that the convictions 
should be reversed.  But it did mean that “these young men should be consid-
ered by the executive as the subject of its clemency.”285 
With no clemency from the executive forthcoming,286 however, the cases of 
the Poston resisters then returned to the courtroom of Judge Ling.  As to 
Takeguma, Tajii, and Fujiota, the proceedings were already effectively final.  
But still pending were the cases of the many dozens of other resisters who had 
stipulated in June of 1945 to have their cases governed by the outcome of the 
Takeguma, Tajii, and Fujiota appeals.  These approximately one hundred men287 
had been out on bail in the interim and, with the reopening of the West Coast in 
late 1944 and the closing of Poston late in 1945, had gone their separate ways.  
Twelve of the men had reported for military service, one was dead, one was 
 
 281. See United States v. Kuwabara, 56 F. Supp. 716, 719 (N.D. Cal. 1944) (“It is shocking to the 
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 285. Id. at 442. 
 286. It was not until December 23, 1946, that the president signed an executive order creating an 
amnesty board to consider possible clemency for World War II era draft objectors.  See Exec. Order 
No. 9814, 11 Fed. Reg. 14,645 (Dec. 23, 1946). 
 287. When the defendants entered into the stipulation in June of 1945, there were ninety-five resist-
ers (in addition to Tajii, Takeguma, and Fujiota).  See 98 Jap-Americans Found Guilty of Draft Evasion, 
PHOENIX GAZETTE, June 5, 1945, §2, at 1.  On October 7, 1946, when Judge Ling sentenced the group 
after the Ninth Circuit’s decision on the Takeguma appeal, there were one hundred and one resisters.  
See Penny Fines Meted 101 Jap-Americans, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 8, 1946, at 6. 
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hospitalized, and two had been repatriated to Japan.288  All of those who were 
able to do so, however, had to return from around the country to Judge Ling’s 
Phoenix courtroom for their sentencing on October 7, 1946.  Many made the 
trip with suitcases packed and ready for the prison term they were expecting to 
receive.289 
As it turned out, they had packed their suitcases needlessly.  Judge Ling, 
taking his third pass at sentencing internees from Poston for resisting the draft, 
again changed his mind.  No transcript of the sentencing hearing survives, but a 
newspaper account reports that Ling highlighted the inconsistency in the gov-
ernment’s first “banish[ing]” the men from the West Coast “to prevent their 
committing sabotage,” but then turning around and “order[ing] [them] into 
military service where [the] opportunity for sabotage was limitless.”290  Appar-
ently Judge Ling had finally lost all patience with the inequity in the govern-
ment’s treatment of the Nisei.  He therefore sentenced each of them to a fine of 
one penny.291  The very surprised and very relieved resisters happily paid their 
penny and left court as free men, to return to their homes and resume the diffi-
cult process of piecing back together the lives that had been interrupted by 
years of incarceration at the Poston Relocation Center. 
That resolution of the case left only the cases of Tajii, Takeguma, and Fuji-
oka to settle.  As Judge Ling had already sentenced them to a year in prison, 
the one-cent fine was not an option for these three men.292  Instead, he stayed 
execution of their prison sentences for six months so that they could apply for 
the executive clemency that Judge Denman had maintained they were owed.  
Fourteen months later, on Christmas Eve in 1947, these three men, along with 
all the rest of the several hundred Japanese Americans who had resisted the 
draft while under WRA detention, received a full pardon from President Harry 
Truman.293 
VI 
IN DEFENSE OF AMBIGUITY 
Before they were ultimately pardoned, Nisei draft resisters from the Poston 
Relocation Center received three different sentences.  The first ten resisters 
were sentenced to three-year terms in 1944.  Of the remaining approximately 
one hundred, three received sentences of one year in 1945, while the rest were 
 
 288. See id. 
 289. See Telephone Interview with I. Lui Kodama, at 15 (July 23, 2004); Telephone Interview with 
Joseph Kaminaka, at 16 (July 27, 2004). 
 290. Penny Fines, supra note 287. 
 291. See id. 
 292. At the time, a federal district court lacked the authority to alter a criminal sentence imposed 
during a court term after that term expired.  See United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304 (1931); United 
States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55 (1914). 
 293. See MULLER, supra note 3, at 181-82. 
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fined a penny in 1946.  Is there any way to explain this ever-diminishing assess-
ment of the Poston resisters’ wrongdoing? 
One explanation is the changing circumstances of the war from March of 
1944 to June of 1945 to October of 1946.  In March of 1944, thousands of draft-
age men at Poston remained to be called for pre-induction physical examina-
tions and for induction, and the government naturally wished to deter as many 
of them as possible from making the choice that the first ten resisters had made.  
In addition, the Allied invasion of France had not yet begun.294  Japan still held 
the Philippines, the Marianas Islands, and large portions of China.295  The dura-
tion of the war and even its outcome were open questions.  Manpower needs 
were huge.  By June of 1945, Hitler had committed suicide296 and Germany had 
unconditionally surrendered.297  U.S. troops were well on their way to securing 
the capture of Okinawa.298  The outcome of the war in the Pacific was no longer 
in question.  And on the day in 1946 when Judge Ling imposed the final one-
penny fine, the Selective Service System suspended the military draft entirely.299  
Plainly, the threat posed by draft evasion diminished over the two-and-a-half-
year period between Judge Ling’s first sentence and his last. 
Another explanation is a process of education.  In March of 1944, Judge 
Ling had little experience with the Poston Relocation Center, its residents, and 
the circumstances of their lives.  By June of 1945, Judge Ling had witnessed—
and blocked—the government’s effort to use the sedition laws to silence George 
Fujii for complaining about the deprivation of Nisei civil rights.  The United 
States Supreme Court had invalidated the War Relocation Authority’s claimed 
power to keep loyal Japanese Americans in the camps,300 and justices of the Su-
preme Court had filed opinions criticizing the removal of Japanese Americans 
from the West Coast as unconstitutional and racist.301  By October of 1946, the 
public image of Japanese Americans had gotten a boost from the victorious re-
turn from Europe of the brave and highly decorated Nisei soldiers of the 442nd 
Regimental Combat Team,302 and Judge Denman had filed his compassionate 
concurring opinion in the Takeguma appeal laying the primary blame for the 
Nisei draft resistance at the feet of the government.303  Judge Ling therefore 
 
 294. The Normandy invasion began on June 6, 1944.  See ROBERT GORALSKI, WORLD WAR II 
ALMANAC: 1931-1945, at 321 (1981). 
 295. Japan held onto the Philippines until late July of 1945.  See id. at 413.  The Marianas fell in June 
of 1944.  See id. at 325-26.  Japan did not completely leave China until the late summer of 1945.  See id. 
at 415-18. 
 296. Hitler committed suicide on April 30, 1945.  See id. at 401-02. 
 297. The Germans surrendered on May 7, 1945.  See id. at 404. 
 298. U.S. forces completed the capture of Okinawa on June 22, 1945. See id. at 411. 
 299. See Sidney Shalett, Draft Halted for Rest of ‘46 in Rush of Army Volunteers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
12, 1946, at 1. 
 300. See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944). 
 301. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 226-34 (1944) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 
242-48 (Jackson, J., dissenting); id. at 234-42 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 302. See MULLER, supra note 3, at 179. 
 303. United States v. Takeguma, 156 F.2d 437, 442 (9th Cir. 1946) (Denman, J., concurring). 
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should not be overly faulted for changing his assessment of the wrongfulness of 
the Poston resisters’ defiance.  While we cannot know for sure what motivated 
him, there is ample evidence that his shifting sentences reflected both the di-
minishing threat that the resisters’ defiance posed and his own increasing ability 
to empathize with the dilemma they faced. 
The sentence on which he ultimately settled, however, had problems of its 
own.  Judge Ling rejected the approach of all of the other federal judges who 
handled comparable cases.  On the one hand, unlike the other judges who sen-
tenced the Nisei draft resisters from other camps, imposing multi-year prison 
terms, Judge Ling sentenced the Poston resisters to a fine of just one cent.  On 
the other hand, unlike Judge Goodman, who dismissed the criminal charges 
against the Tule Lake resisters, Judge Ling convicted the Poston resisters on 
those charges.  With his criminal conviction and one-penny fine, Judge Ling ap-
peared to create an odd and internally contradictory category of blameless guilt 
for the Poston resisters. 
To be sure, this resolution of the dilemma of internee draft resistance lacked 
the moral and rhetorical power of Judge Goodman’s outright dismissal of the 
charges:  that it was “shocking to the conscience that an American citizen be 
confined on the ground of disloyalty, and then, while so under duress and re-
straint, be compelled to serve in the armed forces, or for not yielding to such 
compulsion.”304  Goodman scorned the Justice Department for its “overzealous-
ness in an attempt to reach, via the criminal process, those whom we may regard 
as undesirable citizens.”305 
On this point, District Judge Goodman and Circuit Judge Denman saw 
things at least somewhat similarly.  In his concurring opinion in the Takeguma 
appeal, Judge Denman noted the “conditions of great oppression and humilia-
tion”306 in which the Nisei had been held and the “justifiable resentment”307 that 
mistreatment had engendered.  These oppressive conditions, for Judge Den-
man, made the United States, not the Nisei, the “first and greater wrongdoer”308 
in their standoff over the draft. 
Judge Goodman’s approach, however, pressed beyond Judge Denman’s, to 
absolve the Nisei of all responsibility for the choices they made, and even of the 
capacity to make choices.  In Goodman’s view, the government’s unconscion-
able treatment of the Tule Lake resisters mooted all other questions in the case; 
it so thoroughly and coercively pervaded the resisters’ minds as to strip them of 
their free agency and their responsibility for the choices they made in respond-
ing to their calls for induction.309  The Nisei were entirely passive receptacles of 
 
 304. United States v. Kuwabara, 56 F. Supp. 716, 719 (N.D.Cal. 1944). 
 305. Id. 
 306. Takeguma, 156 F.2d at 442 (Denman, J., concurring). 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. 
 309. See Kuwabara, 56 F. Supp. at 719 (“a defendant under the[se] circumstances is not a free agent, 
nor is any plea that he may make, free or voluntary.”) 
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the government’s wrongdoing, rather than active beings with at least some ca-
pacity to make decisions affecting their lives.  The government was not merely 
the “first and greater wrongdoer,” as Judge Denman believed;310 it was the only 
actor in the drama of the draft. 
Judge Ling saw the situation differently.  The Nisei, for Judge Ling, were ac-
tors in the drama who retained their complex human capacity to make choices 
in conditions of great adversity.  Judge Ling did not blind himself to that adver-
sity; his one-cent fine surely was a message to the government and to the public 
that no matter what their individual motives, the resisters could not fairly be 
punished for responding as they did to the unconscionable choice that the gov-
ernment had forced upon them.  But he also did not blind himself to the fact 
that these young men did make choices, and that their choices may have been 
motivated by reasons ranging from the noble to the self-serving. 
Judge Goodman’s resolution of the cases of the Nisei draft resisters may be 
the more inspiring.  But Judge Ling’s resolution corresponds more closely to the 
reality of the Poston draft resistance as revealed in the notes, memoranda, and 
correspondence of those who observed it from close up.  These sources estab-
lish that the group of Poston resisters included some who saw the draft as a 
moment to seek judicial redress of the wrongs practiced on the Nisei and some 
who saw the draft as a moment to leave an undoubtedly futile marker of protest 
in the historical record.  It included some whose initial draft-avoiding gambit of 
seeking leave for agricultural work had failed, and some who felt duty-bound to 
care for aging and vulnerable parents in camp.  It included some whose disgust 
at their mistreatment had matured into an out-and-out desire to abandon their 
citizenship and cast their lot with Japan, and some whose expatriation requests 
reflected a simple desire to keep their family intact.  “The sad and unfortunate 
part of the [draft] situation,” Project Attorney Rowley reported in April of 
1945, “[was] that some of the boys who are resisting the draft are among our 
finest boys in this center.”311  Yet some were also among Poston’s most incorri-
gible troublemakers.312 
In sum, the convictions and one-penny fines that Judge Ling imposed on the 
Poston draft resisters were ambiguous and conflicted judgments.  But reactions 
to the draft at Poston were themselves ambiguous and conflicted.  They were 
unpredictable and often passionately human responses to unfairness and adver-
sity.  So too, of course, were the responses of those who chose to comply with 
the draft rather than to resist it.  As one Nisei put it in July of 1944, “[a]lthough 
I don’t especially see any reason to fight for the United States, I’d choose the 
army to another camp because I don’t think that I can stand another couple of 
 
 310. Takeguma, 156 F.2d at 442 (Denman, J., concurring). 
 311. Letter from Scott Rowley to Edwin E. Ferguson, at 2, supra note 51, at Reel 196, Frame 179. 
 312. See Letter from Scott Rowley to Philip M. Glick, at 2, supra note 51, at Reel 196 (“I will say 
that the boys who are out on bond have not been creating any disturbance lately.  One of them is serv-
ing time in the Yuma County Jail for disturbance, but he was a disturber before, and probably always 
will be.”). 
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years in jail or a camp.  [And] [i]f I had the chance, I would be more than will-
ing to fight for the Japanese Army.”313  The Nisei response to the draft at the 
Poston Relocation Center simply did not fit into neat dyadic pairings of “loyal” 
and “disloyal,” “honorable” and “dishonorable,” “courageous” and “cowardly.”  
They were more richly human than that. 
Some at Poston understood this complexity quite clearly.  Late in June of 
1944, Issei parents revived the pre-evacuation practice of soko-kai, which was a 
send-off party for soldiers leaving for active duty.314  In one block, however, this 
practice caused controversy among the Issei.  Some favored the idea, but others 
argued that as Japanese aliens in a relocation center, they could not participate.  
As Richard Nishimoto noted in his diary, these Issei believed that “[t]hey were 
treated as enemy aliens, and as such they could not honor the Nisei who were to 
leave the camp to join the American army.”315  The block eventually decided to 
do away with the soko-kai entirely, and instead simply to give each departing 
soldier a senbetsu, or going-away gift, of five dollars.316  But then another prob-
lem presented itself.  Some of the Nisei in the block were responding to the call 
for induction by refusing, and the Issei wished to acknowledge their response 
too.  Yet the Issei realized that with the FBI watching, they “could not jeopard-
ize their positions by giving an elaborate party to the draft dodgers.”317  The Issei 
therefore compromised: they “modified the rule of donating [s]enbetsu to the 
Nisei leaving for [the military] to include the draft evaders leaving for the Yuma 
or Phoenix jail.”318  They gave five dollars to the inductees and the resisters 
equally. 
This vignette captures a great deal about the complex and ambiguous reality 
of the Nisei reaction to the draft at the Poston Relocation Center.  It allows us 
to see all of the reactions and choices that the Nisei made as alternate human 
responses to an unjust and conflicted government demand.  Judge David Ling’s 
decision simultaneously to punish and to excuse the Poston resisters—however 
inconsistent it might at first appear—shares with the Issei senbetsu donations an 
appreciation of the full human complexity of the Nisei response to adversity. 
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